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INTRODUCTION
Since the turn of the century observers of international society have predicted
that small and medium-sized States will fade from international life. All but the
largest polities must, in this view, succumb to the pressures of modem interna-
tional politics and economics, and soon, the world community will consist of but a
handful of mega-States. 2 With the advent of the Cold War, the conviction, as ex-
pressed in both fiction 3 and scholarship,4 grew that international society, in a pro-
cess of ruthless rationalization, would eliminate most of the several score States
then generally recognized, and a homogenized map of continental-scale super-
powers would result. 5 From 1918 at the latest, however, other observers began to
apprehend just the opposite: impelled by the principle of self-determination, nas-
cent or reawakened nationalities would flee the capture of empires and States and,
in so doing, would bring about the disintegration of international order.
6
2. Generally fostering the view at the turn of the century were the theorists of 'geo.
politics.' On one of the founders of geopolitics, see W.H. PARKcER, MAcnamER:
GEOGRAPHY AS ANIAID TO STATECRA"Fr (1982). Representative of Mackinder's work is H.J.
Mackinder, The Geographical Pivot of History, XXIII GEOGRAPIC J. 421 (1904) (positing
that several great powers were competing for global dominion by attempting to control the
Eurasian landmass). Among historians popularizing similar views of the future of the State
were KARL HAUSHOFER, BAUSTEINE ZuR GEOPOLITIK (1928) and LEOPOLD VON RANKE, Dm
GRosSE MACrTE (1917).
3. GEORGE ORWELL, NINETEEN EIGHTY-FouR, 15, 161, 194-95 (Compact Books,
1987) (1949) (discussing three fictional totalitarian States: Oceania, Eurasia, and Eastasia,
which are the sole entities in an international society); see also Michael Lind, In Defense
of Liberal Nationalism, FOREIGN A'F., May 1, 1994, at 87 (positing "If the viability of a
state is defined as its military invulnerability in the absence of allies and economic
autarky, then the only viable states would be isolationist, continental superpowers (rather
like Eastasia, Eurasia and Oceania of Orwell's 1984).").
4. See, e.g., David Vital, The Analysis of Small Power Politics, in SMALL S'rATEs IN
INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS 23, 27 (August Schou & Arne Olav Brundtland eds., 1971)
(noting the tendency of small States to be absorbed into the spheres of influence of big
States and to preserve their freedom only if "free of pressure").
5. The overshadowing influence of two superpowers between 1945 and 1990 added
credence to the proposition that smaller entities were being relegated at best to marginal
positions. The concerns of the Non-Aligned Movement supported the proposition, and
Cold War political theorists postulated the primacy of the bipolar structure. See Stuart
Corbridge, Colonialism, Post-colonialism and the Political Geography of the Third World,
in POLITICAL GEOGRAPHY OF THE TWENTrTH CENTURY: A GLOBAL ANALYsis 171, 173 (Peter
J. Taylor ed., 1993) (relating the anxiety of developing countries in facing the superpow-
ers); HANs J. MORGENTHAU, AMERICAN FOREIGN POLICY: A CRmcAL EXAMINATION 45-48
(1952) (discussing cold war bipolarity). The political, military, and economic weight of the
United States and the Soviet Union seemed to some observers to marginalize international
law as well. Duursma identifies in Micro-States a potential law-building role. See infra
notes 140-43 and accompanying text (discussing Liechtenstein's legal structure).
6. Though Woodrow Wilson advocated self-determination, his Secretary of State,
Robert Lansing, was one of the first to express concern that the principle would result in
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Jorri C. Duursma's new work investigates a phenomenon which seems to con-
found both these expectations: the persistence in Europe of five diminutive States
overshadowed by much larger States as well as by the ever-consolidating structure
of the European Union. Duursma examines five Micro-States:7 Liechtenstein,
San Marino, Monaco, Andorra, and the Vatican City, and asks how the diversity
born of self-determination can be accommodated in a society of States anxious to
enforce the countervailing principle of territorial integrity. The Micro-States
which Duursma describes and evaluates in five exhaustively-documented chapters
furnish examples of how small communities can perfect a right to self-
determination, yet avoid disrupting the organizing structures important to inter-
national stability. In all five case studies, Duursma identifies international law
and its institutions as critical mediators between pressure for consolidation and
principles of diversity and between the interests of larger neighbor States and the
right to self-determination of the Micro-States.
Each case study begins with a description of the history and present geography,
international disorder. Lansing wrote:
The phrase is simply loaded with dyiamite. It vill raise hopes vhich can never be realized. It
will, I fear, cost thousands of lives. In the end it is bound to be discredited, to b: called the
dream of an idealist waio failed to realize the danger until too late to check those who attempt to
put the principle in force. What a calamity that the phrase %--as ever uttered! What nizy it %,ill
cause!
RoBERTLANsiNG, Tm PEAcE NEGOTATiONS, A P soNAL NARRATIE 97-8 (1921) (ruiting
on December 30, 1918). Lansing would not be the last to fear the consequences of the
doctrine attributed to Wilson. See Philip Marshall Browai, The Legal Effects of Recogni-
tion, 44 Ai J. ITr'L L. 617, 621 (1950) (noting its inquiry into the domestic affiirs of
states and unflatteringly comparing the Wilson Doctrine to the doctrine of legitimism es-
poused by the Holy Alliance after the Congresses of Vienna and Aix-la-Chappelle,
ANrroNlo CAssEsE, SELF-DEEMINATION OF PEoPLEs: A L GAL REAPPRAIsAL 39-40 (1995)
(citing the Colombian delegate to the First Committee of the First Commission of the San
Francisco Conference of 1945 (establishing the United Nations) who termed self-
determination "tantamount to international anarchy); see also Thomas M. Francl, Post-
modern Tribalism and the Right to Secession, in PEOPLES AND MINoRmrE IN
h TIOxioALAw (Br6lmann et al. eds., 1993); David Fromkin, The ComingMillenium:
World Politics in the Twenty-First Century, 10(1) WORLD POL'Y J. 1, 3 (1993) (positing
that "[like some sorcerer's apprentice, the principle that no people should be ruled by an-
other has accelerated out of control").
7. Duu miA, supra note 1, at 145-146. Duursma capitalizes "Micro-States" evidently
to emphasize their distinctness as a phenomenon. This does not necessarily follow prece-
dent and might have merited a short explanation. See JoHN DUaAD, REcomNiToNm AiD TI
UNrr= NATIoNS 70 (1987) (referring to the diminutive State as a 'microstate' or 'mini-
state'); PATRICIAWOILGEhmUTBLAm, THE MuTATE DILE.&A 2 (rev. ed. 196S) (terming
it a 'ministate'); IAN BRoWNLE, PRINCIPLES OF PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW (4th ed. 1990)
85-86 (calling it a 'Micro-State'); LASSA OPPENHEI,1 hnERNAiONAL LAr A TREA=s 256
(Hersch Lauterpacht ed., 8th ed. 1955) (describing it as 'very small'), see also JAMsS
CRAWFORD, CREATION OF STATES IN INTERNATIONAL LAW ix (1979) (providing the rationale
behind capitalizing "State").
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demographics, and economics of its subjectY Duursma then describes in great
detail the constitutional and legal order of the Micro-State 9 and its external rela-
tions and policies.10 The author treats the latter topic under the separate headings
of "Relations with States" and "Relations with International Organizations." The
conclusion of each case study analyzes the legal status of the Micro-State in ques-
tion and discusses its self-determination in view of generally accepted criteria for
statehood.
Before examining the Micro-States, Duursma sets the stage with one of the
more thorough discussions of self-determination and statehood in recent litera-
ture. 11
I. SETTING THE STAGE
Oppenheim proposed that a scholar of international law would do well to begin
any analysis by inquiring into the origins and subsequent usage of the vocabulary
of her subject. 12 Duursma appears to have taken Oppenheim's advice to heart. In
perhaps one of the most thorough analyses to date of the origins of self-
determination and its present place in international law,13 Duursma seeks the
earliest references to the principle and then traces its development, from the
French Declaration of the Rights of Man, through Woodrow Wilson's Draft Arti-
cle 3 of the Covenant of the League of Nations, and on to the present. Opposition
of statesmen, including Wilson's own Secretary of State, Robert Lansing, blocked
his motion to codify a right to self-determination in the League Covenant. Self-
determination had, however, been introduced into the vocabulary of statecraft.
Duursma identifies the Third Principle of the Atlantic Charter of August 14, 1941
as the first official reference, albeit by implication only, to a right of self-
determination. Without expressly using the term self-determination, the Charter
declared illegal "territorial changes that do not accord with the freely expressed
wishes of the peoples concerned."
14
The focus of the author's analysis of self-determination then turns to the
United Nations (UN) Charter and its travaux pr~paratoires. Article 1, paragraph
2, and Article 55 of the Charter contain the first explicit references to self-
8. DuusMA, supra note 1, at 147-50, 207-11,261-64, 316-20, 374-76.
9. Id. at 150-60, 211-22,264-74, 320-34, 376-86.
10. Id. at 160-200, 222-55,264-91, 334-66, 386-410.
11. See LEo C. BucHHErr, SECEssIoN: THE LEGrraIAcY oF SELF-DETERMINATION 1-42,
138-215 (1978); ALFRED COBBAN, THE NATION STATE AND NATIONAL SELF-DETERMINATION
(1969); CRAWFORD, supra note 7, at 3-169 (setting forth in Part 1. the Concept of State-
hood in International Law). See generally CASSESE, supra note 6 (containing a recent
comprehensive treatment of self-determination);
12. Lassa Oppenheim, The Science of International Law: Its Task and Method, 2 AM.
J. INT'LL. 313, 315-17 (1908).
13. DtuRSMA, supra note 1, at 7-109.
14. Id. at 10 (citing text of the Joint Declaration of the President and the Prime Min-
ister, 35 Suppl. AJM, 191-92 (1941)).
[12:4
DUURWM BOOK REVIEW
determination in a multilateral legal instrument. Duursma argues, however, that
despite the importance of the United Nations' early references to self-
determination, two other factors were equally important (1) the fleshing-out of
the term through a subsequent half-centtmy of General Assembly practice, and (2)
the definition of the units of people possessing the self-determination right.
15
Duursma posits that the challenge in defining self-determination is defining
what groups of humanity are entitled to the purported right The UN Trusteeship
system, under Articles 73(b) and 76(b) of the Charter, call, respectively, for the
self-government and independence of Non-Self-Governing Territories. Duursma
questions whether. (1) self-government and independence are identical, and 2) all
Non-Self-Governing Territories are guaranteed independence under the Trustee-
ship system. Duursma shows that the Charter answers neither question clearly.
Consequently, the basic law of the UN is, at best, a starting point for the further
development of self-determination.
16
The General Assembly passed a Declaration on the Granting of Independence
to Colonial Countries and Peoples on December 14, 1960.17 The colonial powers
opposed the Declaration; the anxiety was widespread that self-determination could
cause the breakdown of international order. Further General Assembly Resolu-
tions, such as the Declaration on Principles of International Law concerning
Friendly Relations and Co-operation among States in Accordance with the Char-
ter of the UN of October 24, 1970,18 continued the debate over self-determination,
but UN instruments limited themselves to a principle of self-determination. In-
ternational drafters seemed to shy away from characterizing self-determination as
a right. The United Nations did not address whether a right to independence
might extend outside that special category, leaving unclear even whether the Non-
Self-Governing Territories under the Trusteeship system enjoyed a right to inde-
pendence. The UN was far from specifying regions or peoples as beneficiaries of
self-determination, or, for that matter, even from announcing general criteria of
eligibility for such a right. Duursma notes that one rule did emerge: it was essen-
tial to have a strong link between the putative people subject to self-determination
and a particular definable territory. The UN could safely consider Non-Self-
Governing Territories to possess a right of self-determination if they were not
physically attached to a metropolitan state and if their populations bore a demon-
strable connection to them. This covered most European colonies. Politics, how-
ever, made a bolder assertion of the right unlikely. The Annex to the Declaration
on Principles of International Law concerning Friendly Relations and Co-
operation among States in fact clarified, in its section entitled "the Principle of
15. Id. at 12-16.
16. Id. at 15-17. Cassese puts it less charitably. "mhe principle [of self-
deteimination] enshrined in the UN Charter boils dovm to very little[.]" CASSES, supra
note 6, at 42.
17. GA Res. 1514 (XV), U.N. GAOR, 15th Sess., Supp. No. 16, U.N. Doc. AJL323
(1960) [hereinafter Colonial Independence Declaration].
18. GA Res. 2625 (XXV), U.N. GAOR 6th Comm., 25th Sess., Supp. No. 28, UN
Doc. A/8082 (1970).
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Equal Rights and Self-determination of People, Paragraph 7," that a countervail-
ing principle must be recognized in any debate over self-determination-the prin-
ciple of territorial integrity. 19 By taking extra notice of the principle of territorial
integrity, the UN moderated its statement in the Declaration on the Granting of
Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples that subjects of self-
determination included potentially any peoples under "alien subjugation, domina-
tion, or exploitation," 20 whether or not of a colonial origin, and any peoples
lacking representative government.
21
Pursuant to General Assembly Resolution 545(VI) of 1952,22 two international
human rights covenants were promulgated on December 15, 1966. Duursma dis-
cusses the two covenants, the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights
(ICCPR)23 and the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural
Rights (ICESCR),24 in some detail.25 ICESCR contained the stronger reference to
self-determination, stating in Article I that "[aill peoples have the right of self-
determination." 26 Duursma proposes, however, that this codification may have
been premature, stating "Self-determination was regarded as a political principle
of very strong moral force, but too complex to translate into legal terms in an in-
strument which was to be legally enforced." 27 Reflecting the noted complexity,
ICESCR called only for "progressive realization" of its terms. By contrast,
ICCPR, less ambitious in the rights it posited, called for "immediate respect."
States objected to the 1966 Covenants on four grounds: (1) the principles they
enunciated were not found in the 1948 UN Declaration of Human Rights; (2) the
principles had moral but not legal force; (3) collective rights but not individual
rights might have arisen under the headings suggested by the Covenants (ICCPR
provides for individual communication to a UN organ in cases where violations
are alleged); and, (4) Article 1 of ICESCR, in its vagueness, invited political ma-
nipulation. According to Duursma, however, the primary difficulty with the
ICCPR and ICESCR was their failure to adopt a definition of "peoples." With no
guide to determine what groups are eligible for the rights posited, the rights could
have little effect. Nonetheless, Duursma identifies the two 1966 Covenants as a
milestone. Despite their limitations, ICCPR and ICESCR are the first intema-
19. Id., cited in UNITrED NATi OsS RESOLUTIONS, series I, vol. XIII 1970-1971, at 340
(Dusan J. Djonovich ed. 1976).
20. Colonial Independence Declaration, supra note 17.
21. DuuRsMA, supra note 1, at 17-26.
22. Inclusion in the International Covenant on Human Rights of an Article Relating to
the Right of Peoples to Self-determination, G.A. Res. 545 (VI), 6th Sess., Supp. No. 20,
Agenda Item 29, U.N. Doc. A/2119 (1952) [hereinafter G.A. Res. 545 (VI)].
23. DuuRsMA, supra note 1, at 27, 33-34.
24. Id. at 27, 34.
25. See also CASSESE, supra note 6, at 52-66 (treating self-determination in the ICCPR
and ICESCR). Duursma, however, investigates the drafting debates more thoroughly than
Cassese.
26. DUuRsMA, supra note 1, at 27 n.96 (quoting G.A. Res. 545 (VI), supra note 22).
27. Id. at 29 (citations omitted).
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tional binding documents to refer to a right of self-determination. 28
A. DEBATING SELF-DETERMINATION
After setting forth the development of the term self-determination, Duursma
presents an equally thorough discussion of the legal debate surrounding the term
and its application. The possibility that runaway self-determination would dis-
member existing States occupied deliberations in the UN and UN organs. The size
of possible States, by contrast, scarcely seemed to matter. The UN Commission on
Human Rights established a Subcommission on Prevention of Discrimination and
Protection of Minorities, and a Special Rapporteur, Hdctor Gros Espiell, under the
aegis of the Subcommission made extensive findings about small States. Gros Es-
piell found that diminutiveness is no bar to self-determination, but that several
other factors did demand care. These were the possibilities that: (1) very small
States would succumb to undue external influence, (2) resource-poor States would
have difficulty in discharging the duties of UN membership, and (3) fragmenta-
tion of large states into Micro-States could endanger international society.39 The
nascent law of small States did not appear concerned with size, but political and
material reality demanded some constraints on State-formation.
30
Duursma proposes that self-determination meets its limit in a rule that only
"peoples" are valid subjects of the right In proposing this, she also introduces one
of the more interesting ideas of this wide-ranging work. In contemplating which
parts of humanity are beneficiaries of a right to self-determination, one tends to
think of groups which lack their own independent international organization-
claimants to (as opposed to possessors of) statehood. Duursma describes the
standard debate over self-determination but emphasizes a point generally missed
there: self-determination is also a right of peoples who already possess States.
This is not a new point The 1970 Declaration on Friendly Relations lists peoples
already possessing independent States as proper beneficiaries of a right to self-
determination. Duursma, however, underlines the self-determination of such
groups.3 1 This is an important point for the subject of a book on Micro-States.
The smallest entities in international society are more exposed than others to the
forces of economics, politics, demographics, and social change. They rely, then,
on the legal pillars of their existence perhaps to a greater measure than other sup-
28. Id. at 30-35. Further references to self-determination can be found in instnunents
outside the UN context. Duursma lists the African Charter on Human Rights and Peoples'
Rights of 1981, Articles 19 & 20; the Final Act of the Conference on Security and Coop-
eration in Europe (Helsinki Declaration of 1975), Principle VIII (a non-binding instru-
ment); and the Charter of Paris for a New Europe of 1990. Id. at 35-36.
29. Id. at 37-40.
30. Cf. Thomas K. Franck & Paul Hoffman, The Right of Seif-determination in Very
Small Places, 8 N.Y.U. J. IT'tL L. & POL. 331 (1975-76) (discussing the self-
detemfination of a handful of small Non-Self-Governing Territories: Belize, Djibouti, East
Timor, Falkland Islands, Gibraltar, and Western Sahara).
31. DutmuMp,, supra note 1, at 40.
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ports. And their relative reliance on the law is greater than that of larger States.
This theme is pervasive in Duursma's discussion.
Defining "peoples" nonetheless has proved fraught with difficulty. The exer-
cise poses particular problems when a putative people composes part of a larger
whole or resides within a State in which another people prevails. The attachment
of a people to a territory-and, moreover, the duration of their attachment-is a
critical aspect in the definition of a people. Duursma emphasizes the durational
aspect of attachment and identifies time as a distinction between two types of
population. A minority is not the same as a people. A minority, Duursma posits,
lacks the territorial connection essential to peoplehood. 32 But this formula raises
another question: what is the connectedness which merits terming a group a peo-
ple? Gibraltar offers a case in point. Most of the natives of Gibraltar were expelled
by Great Britain in the early eighteenth century.33 Britain today wishes to char-
acterize the present inhabitants as a colonial people. Britain's preferred charac-
terization would, under the UN Special Committee of Twenty-Four on Non-Self-
Governing Territories, give the Gibraltarians the benefit of self-determination.
34
Spain, hoping to win back the strategic territory it lost to England almost three
centuries ago, objects to calling the Gibraltarians a colonial people on the grounds
that they have not lived in Gibraltar long enough to form that degree of territorial
attachment requisite to peoplehood.
35
Self-determination is a right attributed to seventeen Non-Self-Governing Ter-
ritories under the Special Committee brief, and their diminutive size does not
erode this right. 36 Smallness, especially when exacerbated by poverty, may im-
pede their independence for political and economic reasons. But it presents no le-
gal bar. Little controversy surrounded the size and population issues. Problems
arose, however, on the issue of territorial connection. Duursma documents that
debates took place within the Special Committee of Twenty-Four and the General
Assembly over whether to withhold self-determination from "imported" peoples
and how to evaluate when an "imported" people has resided in a place long
32. Id. at 37-46.
33. Id. at 53-54.
34. Id. at 53 n.251 (referencing a referendum vote by Gibraltarians demonstrating
their desire to remain British subjects, 12,138 for British citizenship vs. 44 for Spanish).
35. A Spanish UN representative told the Committee of Twenty-Four, "To recognize
for a people their entitlement to the right to govern their own destiny, it is essential that
there be no doubts as to the existence of identity between that people and its territory."
Doc. No. 102: Intervention of the Representative of Spain Sr. Pinies, before the 'Committee
of Twenty-Four' (September 24, 1964). Documents on Gibraltar Presented to the Spanish
Cortes by the Minister of Foreign Affairs 42, 460 (1965).
36. The Non-Self-Governing Territories and Peoples include: American Samoa, An-
guilla, Bermuda, the British Virgin Inlands, the Cayman Islands, East Timor, the Falkland
Islands, Gibraltar, Guam, Montserrat, New Caledonia, Pitcain, St. Helena, Tokelau, the
Turks and Caicos Islands, Western Sahara, and the United States Virgin Islands.
DtYURMA, supra note 1, at 48 n.18. Of these, Guam has the most inhabitants (139,000),
Pitcairn the fewest (52). DuuRsMA, supra note 1, at 48.
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enough to develop the required connection to it Newly-settled inhabitants, even if
forming most of the population of a discrete territorial unit, may fail to qualify as
a people for want of sufficient connection to the place they live. This is the issue
surrounding Gibraltar.37 Again, Duursma identifies an interesting problem,
which she applies to the peculiar circumstance of the European Micro-States. 8
International judicial decisions provide an uneven record with respect to self-
determination. In 1920, a Commission of Jurists was formed to address the con-
troversy of the Aaland Islands between Sweden and Finland. The Commission
held that "it belongs to the sovereign rights of a definitely constituted State to ac-
cord or refuse to a fraction of the population the right of determining its political
destiny by plebiscite or otherwise."39 Duursma explains that the Permanent Court
of International Justice (PCU-) came in contact with self-determination only in a
request for an advisory opinion on a Russo-Finnish Peace Treaty, but decided not
to accept the request. Minority protection arose as an issue before the PCIJ in the
Rights of Minorities in Upper Silesia (Minority Schools) case in 1928 and the
Greco-Bulgarian "Communities" case in 1930. The judgments in these inform
Duursma's definition of a people. Crucially for the author's subsequent treatment
of the Micro-States, a people must possess both objective and subjective aspects of
peoplehood. According to the PCIJ, a community is:
[A] group of persons living in a given country or locality, having a race, religion,
language and traditions of their own and united by this identity of race, religion,
language, and traditions in a sentiment of solidarity, with a view to preserving
their traditions, maintaining their form of worship, ensuring the instruction and
upbringing of their children in accordance with the spirit and traditions of their
race and rendering mutual assistance to each other.4°
37. DuuRsMA, supra note 1, at 40-55; see CAssE-S, supra note 6, at 206-14 (discuss-
ing Gibraltar and self-determination exclusively); S.K.N. Blay, Seif-determination v. Ter-
ritorial Integrity, 18 N.Y.U. 3. INT'LL. & PoL. 441,463-64 (1986) (discussing Gibraltar
and the Falkland Islands as territories the inhabitants of %vhich are "'plantations' of the
colonial administration').
38. The problem brings to mind the population movements and territorial adjustments
that took place at the end of World War IL By treaty (Warsaw Treaty of November 14,
1990), Germany and Poland confirmed the border established between the two countries in
1945. Some twelve million Germans had been relocated from the territory once belonging
to Germany east of the present border. Nationals of a reconstituted Polish State replaced
them. Does Duursma's formula concerning the duration required to form the attachment
prerequisite to people status, consider the Poles in the former Silesia, Pomerania, and East
Prussia a people (or a fraction thereof) entitled to self-determination? Or can complications
arising from such a question be resolved by an agreement such as the Warmsaw Treaty of
1990? Can a treaty estopp claims to peoplehood? On the Polish-German border settlement,
see Ryszard W. Piotrowicz, The Polish-German Frontier in International Lxn: The Final
Solution, 1920 BRrr. Y.B. bNr'LL. 367.
39. DuuRSMA, supra note 1, at 56 (quoting 7 LEAGtmoFNATio~ 0. J. 394-5 (1920)).
40. Interpretation of the Convention Betveen Greece and Bulgaria Respecting Reci-
rocal Emigration (the Greco-Bulgarian "Communities" case), 1930 P.C0L. (ser. B) No. 17,
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Duursma goes on to develop a more liberal definition of peoplehood. The
author's apparent aim of demonstrating the peoplehood of the inhabitants of the
Micro-States may have required this. The nationals of the Micro-States are often
indistinguishable from the nationals of their larger neighbors, at least in terms of
race, religion, language, and traditions. This is indeed a weak point in Duursma's
argument that the Micro-States are proper subjects of self-determination. The
separateness of the Micro-States may justify their status as beneficiaries of the
right of self-determination, but the criteria which Duursma identifies as the pro-
genitors of the modem definition of peoplehood are not clearly in evidence in at
least four of the five States. Duursma must attribute great importance to the sub-
jective aspect of peoplehood, if the Micro-States' deficiencies in the objective as-
pect are not to be fatal to their claims.
Duursma further explores the development of self-determination in interna-
tional decisions. A number of International Court of Justice (ICJ) cases receive
attention, 41 but the author's more interesting observations concern the Human
Rights Committee (established under Article 1 of the Optional Protocol of the
ICCPR) and the Arbitration Commission on Yugoslavia (established by the Peace
Conference on Yugoslavia).
The ICCPR Human Rights Comnmittee has received a handful of claims based
on self-determination. The claims related to the rights of indigenous peoples in
North America, northern Europe, and German-speakers of the South Tyrol. 42 The
Committee has dismissed all such individual claims. Duursma identifies this
precedent as evidence that existing States continue to worry that self-
determination may cause disorder. The author writes, however, that the dismissals
at 21 (July 31), quoted in DUURSMA, supra note 1, at 59.
41. DuuRSMA, supra note 1, at 59-62; Legal Consequencesfor States of the Continued
Presence of South Africa in Namibia (South West Africa) notwithstanding Security Council
Resolution 276 (1970); Western Sahara (1975); and Portugal v. Australia (East Timor
case) (1995). It is appropriate for Duursma to cover this ground, given her aim to present
the full development of self-determination law. For analyses of these cases, see John Dug-
ard, Namibia (South West Africa): The Court's Opinion, South Africa's Response, and
Prospectsfor the Future, 11 COLUM. J. TRANS. L. 14 (1972); Antony J.M. Zuijdwijk, The
International Court and South West Africa: Latest Phase, 3 GA. J. INT'L & COMP. L. 323
(1973); John F. Murphy, Whither Now Namibia? 6 CoRNULI r'L L. J. 1 (1972); Laurence
S. Hanauer, The Irrelevance of Self-Determination Law to Ethno-national Conflict: A New
Look at the Western Sahara Case, 9 EMORY INT'L L. R y. 133 (1995); Brian F. Fitzgerald,
Portugal v. Australia: Deploying the Missiles of Sovereign Autonon and Sovereign
Community, 37 HAgv. INT'L L. J. 260 (1996); see also James Crawford, The General As-
sembly, the International Court and Self-determination, in FnrY YEARS OF Tm
INTERNATIONAL COURT OF JusICE: ESSAYS IN HONOUR OF SaR ROBERT JENNINoS 585
(Vaughan Lowe & Malgosia Fitzmaurice eds., 1996) (discussing East Timor); CASSESE,
supra note 8, at 214-18, 223-30 (discussing Western Sahara and East Timor).
42. For an overview of problems surrounding indigenous peoples, see SOVERmioNTY &
INDIGENOUS RiGHTs: THE TREATY OF WAITANGI IN INTERNATIONAL CONTEXTS (William
Renwick ed., 1991) (containing a collection of essays by anthropologists, historians, ju-
rists, and lawyers on aboriginal treaty rights in Australia and North America).
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of the self-determination cases do not conform with the intent of the ICCPR: "The
decisions on Article 1 of the Covenant made by the Human Rights Committee are
contrary to the intentions of the drafters and not in conformity with the text of
Article 1 of the Optional Protocol."4 3 In connection with the ICCPR cases as well,
Duursma suggests that the critical problem is identifying when a group constitutes
a people, and the author notes that this was a task the drafters of the ICCPR de-
clined to address.
Self-determination confronted the international community upon the collapse
of the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (SFRY) in 1990-91. The Arbitra-
tion Commission on Yugoslavia (known as the Badinter Commission after its
chairman Robert Badinter, President of the French Conseil Constitutlonnel) de-
livered its first opinion on November 29, 1991.44 Opinion 1 approached the ques-
tion whether States had seceded from the SFRY or the SFRY had dissolved.
Opinion 1 held that the SFRY was "in the process of dissolution." 45 Thus, no is-
sue of secession was presented: the parent State soon would simply cease to exist.
Opinion 3, issued January 11, 1992, held that uti possidetisjuris applied to the
inter-republican boundaries of the SFRY.46 This holding relegated self-
determination to a secondary position, after the interests of territorial stability.
Opinion 2 (also of January 11, 1992) grappled the most with self-determination.
4 7
Serbia presented the Peace Conference with the question whether Serbs in Croatia
and Bosnia-Herzegovina are beneficiaries of the right to self-determination.
"[Ijnternational law as it currently stands," the Badinter Commission wrote, "does
not spell out the implications of the right to self-determination. It is well estab-
lished, however, that regardless of the circumstances, the right to self-
determination must not involve changes to existing frontiers at the time of inde-
pendence (uti possidetis juris) except where the States concerned agree other-
wise." 48 Opinion 2 continues by stating that the Serb communities in Croatia and
Bosnia-Herzegovina have the "right to recognition of their identity under interna-
tional lav' and that Article 1 of the ICCPR safeguards human rights, including
an individual's right to affiliate with the community he chooses.4 9 Opinion 4 held
43. DVumsA, supra note 1, at 66.
44. Id. at 67-72 (citing Joe Verhoeven, La Reconnaissance Internationale: Ddclin a,
Renouveau? XXXIX Ann. Frangais de Droit Int'l 7, 26 (1993)). A declaration of the
Twelve (Member States of the EC) established the Commission on August 28, 1991. It
consisted often members: one each chosen by the constitutional courts of Belgium, France,
Germany, Italy, and Spain; two by the Yugoslav federal presidency, and three by the EC
and its Member States. The Commission began meeting in early September. Id.
45. Duunsm., supra note 1, at 67 n.323 (quoting Conference on Yugoslavia Arbitra-
tion Commission Opinion No. 1, 31 LL.M. 1494, 1497 1 3 (1992) [hereinafter Yugoslavia
Arbitration No. 1].
46. Id. at 68 (quoting Conference on Yugoslavia Arbitration Commission Opinion No.
3, 31 LL.M. 1499, 1500 (1992) [hereinafter Yugoslavia Arbitration No. 3].
47. Id. at 69-70 (quoting Conference on Yugoslavia Arbitration Commission Opinion
No. 2, 31 LL.M. 1497, 1498 (1992) [hereinafter Yugoslavia Arbitration No. 2].
48. Id. nnm329-30 (quoting Yugoslavia Arbitration No. 2, supra note 47, at 1497-98).
49. Id. at 70 nn.331-32 (citing Yugoslavia Arbitration No. 2, supra note 47, at 1497-
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that the Serbs in Bosnia-Herzegovina have a right, under self-determination, to
determine in conjunction with its other peoples the status of that republic.
50
Duursma extracts a great deal from the Badinter Opinions. As noted above, it
is important in her analysis of the Micro-States that a strong subjective element
underlies the concept of peoplehood. Opinion 2, Duursma notes, posited that for-
mer citizens of the SFRY, finding themselves in new States, have the right to
choose their nationality. 51 Duursma interprets this, to reiterate the subjective ele-
ment which she must emphasize to sustain her thesis, that the nationals of the
Micro-States constitute peoples to whom flows a right of self-determination.
Without prejudice to Duursma's view that peoplehood contains a substantial sub-
jective aspect, it is debatable whether the Commission's holding evidences such a
broad proposition. A humanitarian crisis confronted the jurists. In Opinion 2,
rather than theorizing about peoplehood, they might have been looking for release
valves to vent the nationalist pressures, which had built up in the space of the
former Yugoslavia. Emphasizing the right of Serbs to opt out of the nascent Croat
State might have been the Commission's attempt to avert further bloodshed in
what had become Europe's first major theater of war since 1945. Duursma reads
into the Opinion an elaboration of the law of self-determination-in particular, an
affirmation of the subjective aspect of peoplehood. 52
Duursma notes that under Opinion 4, Serbs in Bosnia-Herzegovina shared in
the right to determine the future position of that republic.53 This again serves the
98 IT 2 (1992)).
50. Id. at 69-70 (referencing Conference on Yugoslavia Arbitration Commission
Opinion No. 4, 31 I.L.M. 1501 (1992) [hereinafter Yugoslavia Arbitration No. 4].
51. Duu sMA, supra note 1, at 70.
52. The subjectiveness of membership in a nationality may meet a limit when a gov-
ernment imposes objective criteria as conditions of citizenship. Such objective criteria
might be comparatively innocuous, but in certain cases they have been malign. The racial
criteria established over German citizenship by the Nuremburg Laws of 1936 were argua-
bly objective. Many (perhaps a majority) of Germans of Jewish ancestry had the subjective
state of mind of being German, but professions of loyalty and Germanness did not suffice
in many cases to save them from Nazi persecution. The experience of the vast majority of
Germans of Jewish ancestry bespeaks a limit on the subjective aspect of peoplehood. By
contrast, the experience of a peculiar minority of such Germans-only recently docu-
mented in depth-suggests an almost boundless capacity for the subjective aspect to de-
termine an individual's membership in a people. Bryan Rigg explains that a number of
Germans of Jewish ancestry (some had a Jewish parent; others a Jewish grandparent) held
high rank in the armed forces of the Third Reich. See DAILY TELEGRAPH (London) Dec. 2,
1996. These individuals characterized themselves as German, thus establishing them-
selves, in the subjective sense, as a member of the German people. This choice apparently
contributed to their acceptance as Germans even in face of the Third Reich's maniacal
anti-semitism. It must be remembered, though, that very few people of Jewish ancestry
were able to sustain their German identity through subjective traits (and that those who
were able also relied on objective characteristics such as language and religious up-
bringing). Duursma does not inquire into the limits of the subjective aspect of peoplehood.
53. DuuRsMA, supra note 1, at 72.
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author's emphasis on the subjective element of peoplehood. The Serbs, Duursma
writes, could determine Bosnia's future "independently of the wishes of the rest of
the people, namely the other Serbs in Serbia." 54 Duursma proposes that Opinion
4 interpreted international law to allow fractions of a people the right of self-
determination. 55 The factor distinguishing a fraction of a people seems to be ge-
ography. The members of a fraction of a people may not display any traits-at
least objective traits--which distinguish them from the people as a whole, but
they may reside in a discrete territorial unit If they demonstrate a tie of suicient
duration and intensity to that unit, then they, as much as the people as a whole,
may enjoy a right to self-determination. In arguing for the independence and
statehood of the European Micro-States-none of which are populated by a group
markedly distinct from the inhabitants of their neighboring States-Duursma
must rely on this geographic concept. In Duursma's thesis, geography acts in tan-
dem with the subjective aspect of peoplehood.
Others have invested geography in self-determination. Crawford's concept of
the "self-determination unit'56 offers a recent precedent for the idea, and Duurs-
ma cites it as such. "The recognition of a political unit as a people," Duursma
writes, "remains then the decisive criterion for the applicability of the right of
self-determination, although it is not said that the recognition is always of a con-
stitutive nature rather thanjust declaratory." 5
7
Geographic doctrines have long assisted in defining territorial units. Early this
century, Britain and Brazil arbitrated a dispute over the border between British
Guyana and the Amazon. The final arbitral award stated:
[T]he effective occupation of a part of a region, although it may be held to confer
a right to the acquisition of the sovereignty of the Nhole of a region v,,ich con-
stitutes a single organic whole, cannot confer a right to the acquisition of the
whole of a region which, either owing to its size or to its physical configuration,
cannot be deemed to be a single organic whole defacto.
58
The negative portion of this statement rejected to the contiguity dotrine-a
nineteenth century theory of sovereignty on the wane by 1904. Contiguity doctrine
held that, from real control of one territory, sovereignty may be imputed over a
neighboring territory, thus mere contiguity could convey title. In positing that it
54. Id.
55. Id.
56. CRAFORD, supra note 7, at 101, cited in Dum. SA, supra note 1, at 75.
57. Though not in a way that distracts too much distracting from her point, this state-
ment might misconstrue Crawford. Duursma implies that Crawford adheres to the consti-
tutive theory of recognition. Insofar as he takes a position in what he terms the "great de-
bate," Crawford is best described as a declaratist with reservations. On the "great debate,"
see infra note 277.
58. The Award offHis Majesty the ing of Italy vith Regard to the Boundary between
the Colony of British Guiana and the United States of Brazil (the "Guiana Boundary
Case'), in XREP. INT'LARBITRALAWARDS 21-22 (United Nations 1962).
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be asked whether a territory makes up a "single organic whole," however, the ar-
bitral opinion advanced its own geographic doctrine. Some pieces of territory
form compact units, not logically or cleanly divisible. Islands are the most obvious
example. Where only one State exercises any effective control within such a unit,
even if that control does not reach every corner, it makes sense to impute title to
the whole of the unit to that State. This differs from the assertion that mere
proximity of territory to a district effectively controlled by a State gives the State
title to that territory. The rationale behind imputing sovereignty over an entire is-
land when the claimant actually controls only a fraction of the island is that the
territory, for reasons of geography, should be kept a single political unit. At least
absent circumstances militating against such unitary treatment, imputing sover-
eignty over the whole makes sense in view of the lay of the land. The holding in
the British Guyana case relied in part on a doctrine of geopolitical economy and
rationalization. British Guyana posited, in distinction from the contiguity doc-
trine, a comprehensive geographic logic for claims to territory outside actual con-
trol. The emphasis on coherent territorial units seems related to the concept of
self-determination units proposed by Crawford59 and developed further by Duur-
sm .
6 0
Analyzing the Badinter Commission opinions, Duursma elaborates rules on
peoplehood and the applicability of the right of self-determination. The author
may, however, overdraw some of her conclusions about the substance of the
Commission holdings. Badinter Commission Opinion 2 holds that the Serbs in
Croatia and Bosnia-Herzegovina have a "right to recognition of their identity un-
der international law." 61 From this, Duursma makes a rather bold proposition:
[T]he members of the Serbian populations in question are recognized as minori-
ties to vhom minority rights have been conceded, because they are an ethnic, re-
ligious or linguistic community. The Commission implicitly recognizes the appli-
cability of the right of self-determination to these Serbian minorities, because the
principle may be applied to them in potential agreements and imply a right to
choose their nationality.
6 2
Duursma equates the Badinter Commission's phrase "recognized as minori-
ties" to self-determination units; the Serb minorities constitute self-determination
units because they are "recognized as minorities." The evidence for the equation
is: (1) the allowance granted the Serb minorities to engage in international
agreements, and (2) the implied right to choose their nationality. As previously
argued, an alternative interpretation for this second factor may have been to pro-
vide a safety valve in the Balkan civil wars. The first factor, too, may not be best
interpreted as evidence of the Serbs' status as a self-determination unit. Paola
Gaeta finds the presence of the Serb and Croat communities of Bosnia unusual in
59. CRAwFomD, supra note 7, at 105-06.
60. DuuRsMA, supra note 1, at 74-75.
61. Id.
62. Id. at 70.
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the Dayton negotiations. 63 Their presence, Gaeta explains, was politically im-
perative for a peace agreement to be reached.64 Upon signature of the Dayton
Agreements, however, Gaeta posits that the Republika Srpska and the Croat Fed-
eration lost their international personality. The sole act that the two republics exe-
cuted as international persons, then, was to surrender their international person-
ality s6 5 Acknowledgment of the communities as "minorities" must be understood
in the context of an urgent search for a peace settlement in the Bosnian civil war.
It is not accurately understood as a device to create self-determination units in the
Serb minorities. Furthermore, Duursma herself earlier emphasized the difference
between a "minority" and a "people;" it is the latter in Duursma's view that is eli-
gible for the self-determination right.
It is unclear why Duursma interprets Opinion 2 of the Badinter Commission
differently from the holding of the Committee of Jurists in the Aalands case. In
the Aalands case, the jurists declined to attribute a right of self-determination to
the Aalanders but did afford them special minority protections. Duursma correctly
emphasizes this result The plain language of Cpinion 2 seems to stand for a very
similar proposition: a right to separate ethnic identity is accorded (albeit without a
detailed mechanism for the maintenance of this identity, as the Jurists prescribed
in theAalands case), but Opinion 2 does not accord the Bosnian Serbs the right to
determine their place among the society of States. Duursma may over-read the
Badinter Commission on this point. From an acknowledgment of minority rights,
plain in the opinion text, Duursma discerns a declaration of eligibility for self-
determination. The matter would be of little moment, except that Duursma later
puts great emphasis on the difference between autonomy within a State and seces-
sion from it. This difference forms the basis of her most interesting prescriptions,
toward the end of the book.66 Opinion 2 implies a need for minority rights safe-
guards, for the very reason that self-determination is not properly applied to the
Serb minorities. The Badinter Commission's holding with regard to the ethnic
identity of Serbs in the secessionist republics is better read as a continuation of a
long history of European minority rights protections clauses than as an authority
on self-determination law.67
B. SELF-DETERMINATION VERSUS TERRITORIAL INTEGRITY
Duursma concludes that a right to self-determination has entered international
law: "It is not just a pragmatic principle, but a right which has to be respected. An
63. Paola Gaeta, The Dayton Agreements and International Law, 7 EutR. J. Itrr'L L.
147, 159-60 (1996).
64. Id. at 152.
65. Id. at 159-60.
66. See infra notes 97-103 and accompanying text (discussing autonomy within an ex-
isting state).
67. See Barbara Mlkotajczyk, Universal Protection of Minorities: Selected Problems
1993 POL. Y.B. I_'L L. 137. (summarizing the history of minority rights clauses in trea-
ties); see also Rita E. Hauser, Foreword, 11 COLU. J. TiRirs. L. 1, at 1-13 (1972).
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opinio juris sive necessitatis has been formed and proved not only in the colonial
context but also more recently in a non-colonial European context." 68 The scope
of self-determination is broad. The right belongs to all peoples, not just those un-
der alien subjugation. To be beneficiaries of the right, a group must: (1) have the
character of a "people"; and, (2) bear a close relationship to a territory. The bene-
fits of the right do not run to minorities or to newly-settled peoples. Over time,
however, populations such as those of European origin in North America, South
Africa, and Australia may acquire the traits of a people entitled to the right.
69
Duursma notes that self-determination faces a countervailing principle in the
concept of territorial integrity. This, of course, is not a new proposition.70 Peoples
with a connection to a territory possess a right to self-determination, but their ex-
ercise of this right depends upon whether its exercise respects existing States'
rights to territorial integrity. The key question is "when does the right of self-
determination take precedence over the obligation to respect the territorial integ-
rity of a State."71 From this, Duursma suggests an interesting and novel formula-
tion about State recognition. TheL'recognition of States is no stranger to contro-
versy in international law. State practice has witnessed crises over the recognition
of putative new States72 and the legal meaning of recognition itself is uncertain. 73
New views on the subject are welcome. Duursma proposes that recognition
amounts to a signal that the burden in favor of territorial integrity has shifted:
In each case the right of self-determination has to be weighed against respect for
the territorial integrity of a State. It is in this weighing process that international
recognition becomes relevant. Recognition does therefore not imply that a right
of self-determination exists, but that the right of self-determination offsets the
inviolability of the territorial integrity in the given case.
74
68. DuunRsMA, supra note 1, at 78.
69. Id. at 78-79.
70. See, e.g., Matthew C.R. Craven, What's in a Name? The Former Yugoslav Repub-
lic of Macedonia and Issues of Statehood, 1995 AusTL. Y.B. INT'L L. 199, 220-21;
MALcoLM N. SHAW, INTERNATIONAL LAW 302-05 (3d ed. 1991); SusAN L. WOODWARD,
BALKAN TRAGEDY: CHAOS AND DISSOLUTIONAFER TH CoLD WAR 163 (1995).
71. Id. at 81.
72. See David A. Ijalaye, Was 'Biafra' at any Time a State in International Law? 65
AMER. J. INT'L L. 551 (1971) (describing Biafra in the late 1960's as a case in point);
JOHN J. STREMLAU, THE ITIENATIONAL POLrTICS OF THE NIGERIAN CiviL. WAR, 1967-1970
(1977); Laura Silber, Bosnia Asks Recognition from EC: Four Republics Seek Independ-
ence, WASH. POST, Dec. 21, 1991, at A15 (providing Bosnia in the early 1990's as another
example); Hans W. Maull, Germany in the Yugoslav Crisis: From Assertiveness to Impo-
tence (unpublished paper under auspices of Deutsche Forschungsgemeinschaft) (on file
with author); Alexander Mtllen, Die deutsche Rolle bei der Anerkennung derjugoslawis-
chen sezessionsstaaten, 2 Liberal 9 (1992); Colin Warbrick, Recognition of States, 41
INT'L & CoM. L. Q. 473, 474-80 (1992).
73. See infra notes 270-83 and accompanying text (discussing theories of recognition).
74. DuuRSMA, supra note 1, at 80.
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The idea of offsetting a value which is inviolable might raise questions-if in-
violable how can the value be offset?-but Duursma's formulation is useful
nonetheless. In it, Duursma provides a framework for investigating state practice
and opiniojuris in order to determine when indeed self-determination offsets ter-
ritorial integrity.
Little or no tension arises between the two principles in the most common
cases of self-determination. An independent people forming the permanent popu-
lation of an independent State has, like all peoples with a tie to a territory, the
right to self-determination. Exercise of that right does not clash with the territo-
rial integrity of any State. The right of such a people to merge their State with an-
other illustrates the scope of their right 75 Neither do colonial peoples in Non-
Self-Governing and Trust Territories pose a problem. The United Nations de-
clared the integrations of colonies to the metropole a fiction that it would not rec-
ognize. 76 Independence of European colonies, therefore, did not disrupt the ter-
ritorial integrity of the metropolitan States.
77
Trouble arises, however, where colonies bear ties to a neighboring territory.
Can colonial independence disrupt the territorial integrity of a neighboring State?
This question leads Duursma to a careful discussion of colonial enclaves, such as
East Timor, West Irian, Belize, Ifini, Gibraltar, Walvis Bay, Hong Kong, Macao,
and Goa, Daman and Diu. The author's analysis leads to three conclusions about
these territories, representing the colonial entities most closely approximating the
primary subject of her work: (1) if a colonial enclave once belonged to another
State, then the inhabitants of the enclave are probably not a distinct people (and
thus not proper beneficiaries of the right to self-determination); (2) there is no le-
gal obligation to consult the inhabitants if the territory is small and geographi-
cally connected to the neighboring State claiming the territory, and (3) nothing in
State practice excludes small enclaves from lacking a right to self-determination,
except in the case of "micro-entities which have formed a clear distinct territory
over the centuries, the political history of which cannot be assimilated to that of
75. Duun  cites the unifications of Germany and Yemen in 1990. Id. at 81-S2.
76. A number of colonies were declared by European colonial powers to constitute in-
tegral parts of the metropolitan State. Prominent examples included French Algeria and
Portuguese Angola. Upon rejection of this fiction, divorce of the colonies from the colonial
power no longer posed a threat to the territorial integrity of the colonial power.
77. Id. at 82-83. Duursma mentions the problem of heterogeneous colonies and con-
cludes that self-determination units need not be homogeneous. While homogeneity is, in
all likelihood, not a requirement, the problem of the ethnically multifarious colony de-
serves more attention. The secessionists in Biafra, Katanga, or Kashinr might have con-
tested the proposition that self-determination is not affected by the presence of multiple
peoples in one territorial unit. Id.; see IALAYE, supra note 72, at 551; Jomi l STP.n..AU,
Tub-m mnoNALPoLncs oF nm NIGERiAN Crv WAR, 1967-1970 (1977T; Alexis Hera-
clides, Katanga, in TBE SELF-DETEnmaTION oF Mn~orTms iN I rm rATnroA PoLr-cs
71-5 (1991); DUGARD, supra note 7, at 86-90; IS. GURumAJ RAO, L GAL Asners oF rm
KAsHmIRPaOBLEm (1967).
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other States." 78 The exception to this third conclusion, incidentally, covers the
five subjects of the author's case studies.
A more difficult case is that of secession from the metropole itself. What insti-
tution has the competence to decide when self-determination trumps territorial
integrity? Duursma posits that this decision cannot rest with the metropolitan
State; if it did, "it would result in the denial of the international character of the
competing rules in question." 79 In other words, States would never attribute the
right of self-determination to secessionist minorities on their territory. Defining
competence in international law, however, tends to rest in large part with individ-
ual States. Duursma is unclear in the placing of competence to decide the balance
between self-determination and territorial integrity. The recognition of the seces-
sionist republics in Yugoslavia raised questions about the collective nature of rec-
ognition-did international law require recognizing States to coordinate their
policy with others? It appears that an expectation had arisen by 1991 that States
carry out recognition in a collective framework, but each recognizing State ap-
pears to have retained the discretion to choose the broadness of the collective
framework in which to place itself. The States recognizing Croatia and Slovenia
in December 1991 (chiefly Germany and Austria) did so earlier than the majority
of Europe seemed to believe prudent (or legal), but the recognizing States, none-
theless, repeatedly acknowledged a requirement to recognize collectively. The re-
quirement was announced expressly and also by implication (the recognizing
States characterized their acts of recognition as collective). The early-recognizing
States, however, liberally construed the term "collective"; it was up to them to de-
fine the framework of collective reference. Duursma is insightful in positing that a
rule is necessary to mediate the tension between self-determination and territorial
integrity. But she might underestimate the competence of the individual State to
decide where to place the competence to conduct the proposed mediation.
Even if her assumption that the competence to decide the relative weight of the
two competing principles rests with the international community is flawed, Duur-
sma makes a number of interesting observations about the way in which the
community evaluates secessionist claims. Critical to Duursma's proposed mecha-
nism of international evaluation is the institution of State recognition. Central
government authorities in a federal State may oppose secession, but "[t]hrough the
act of recognition, a preference is expressed for the full right of self-determination
of the secessionists."80 As pointed out above, Duursma sees recognition as a bur-
den-shifting device. If before recognition, the burden rested with the secessionists
to prove that their independence would not threaten the territorial integrity of the
parent State, then after recognition the burden shifts to the parent State to prove
that continued integration does not derogate the secessionists' right to self-
determination. In the case of recognition from many States, recognition is even
more than a burden-shifting mechanism; such recognition puts "the 'old' State..
78. DuuRsMA, supra note 1, at 80-88.
79. Id. at 89.
80. Id. at 91.
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. under the obligation to respect the territorial integrity of the 'new' State."
81
Widespread recognition, for Duursma, is determinative.
82
Duursma's novel interrelation of recognition to self-determination and territo-
rial integrity places a certain constitutive force in recognition. Recognition can
"remedy the possible non-fulfillment of a criterion for statehood."8 3 Thus recog-
nition can create elements of statehood lacking in the objective condition of the
putative State. Earlier, it was debated whether recognition constituted the object
community as a State or merely declared that that community had attained the
criteria of statehood 84 Before the 1990s, the general view was that recognition
was declaratory rather than constitutive. 85 State practice since the dissolution of
the USSR and the SFRY has, however, led to a re-evaluation of this view.86 The
nature of recognition-whether it is constitutive or declaratory of statehood-is
no longer a central subject of discourse, but the terms of what Crawford called the
"Great Debate" still provide reference points for analysis of recognition. Duursma,
in identifying a constitutive force in recent recognition practice (her example of
the federal State resisting secession, but being overruled by generalized recogni-
tion, clearly refers to the SERY case), has contributed to the post-Cold War re-
evaluation of recognition.
Duursma also focuses, in connection with secession, on the much-debated issue
81. Id. at 90-91.
82. Id. at 102. This formula raises a question: %.hen is recognition sufficiently wide-
spread to overcome the presumption favoring territorial integrity? The question might have
deserved more analysis, though, in fairness, Duursma's work does not primarily address
recognition. I would propose that recognition take on added weight when it originates from
(1) powerful States, and (2) a representative cross-section of the international community.
Thus recognition from twenty Latin American States might not be as likely to produce the
burden shifting Duursma proposes as recognition from half as many States, representing
Africa, the Arab world, East Asia, Eastern Europe, Latin America, and Western Europe.
Nor might recognition from thirty or forty States comparatively weak in terms of the effec-
tive power processes of the world community have as much impact as, for example, recog-
nition from France, Japan, and the United States. Note in this connection that jurists posit
that the number of signatories to a treaty is relevant to determining the weight of the treaty
in international law. The more parties, the stronger the evidence that the treaty represents
a generally applicable international norm. See Reparations for Injuries Suffered in the
Service of the United Nations case, 1949 LC.J. 174, 185 (Apr. 11).
83. DuRsmA, supra note 1, at 92.
84. See infra note 270.
85. DuuPsmA, supra note 1, at 111. She acknowledges this and agrees that "[wlhether
an entity is a State is a matter of fact, not of recognition." Id. She cites to the ample schol-
arship tending to support a declaratory conception of recognition. Id. at Ill n. 10.
86. See Duncan B. Hollis, Note, Accountability in Chechnya-Addrssing Internal
Matters with Legal and Political International Norms, 36 B.C. L. Rav. 793 (1995) (pro-
posing non-recognition of Chechnya evidences the constitutive doctrine in operation), see
also Trent N. Tappe, Chechnya and the State of Self-Determination in a Breakaway Re-
gion of the Former Soviet Union: Evaluating the Legitimacy of Secessionist Claims, 34
CoLuiM. J. TRANSNAT'LL. 255 (1995).
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of human rights and statehood. Human rights violations, since the nearly univer-
sal nonrecognition of Rhodesian independence, 87 have reduced the prospects of
recognition for States perpetrating such violations. States created through or
resting upon violations ofjus cogens have been denied recognition, with the non-
recognition of Manchukuo a forerunner of the practice surrounding Rhoclesia.88
Duursma adds an interesting twist to this matter. Instead of focusing on how hu-
man rights violations can diminish the legal stature of their perpetrators, she asks
whether being a victim of such delicts entitles a people to recognition. If a people
suffers an oppression denying itjus cogens rights, does the people thus acquire a
right to secede under self-determination? Duursma concludes, after analyzing Na-
gorno Karabakh and Bangladesh, that violations of fundamental rights do not in-
dependently place self-determination ahead of the competing value of territorial
integrity. The violations may provide evidence in support of secession, but they do
not alone shift the burden against the parent State. 89
Other factors also provide evidence favoring self-determination. The total dis-
ruption of an existing State may expedite recognition of new States.90 And federal
units may generally have an easier time securing self-determination in face of the
territorial integrity principle than other pieces of a parent State. This leads to an
interesting observation. No rule of law prefers federal units to lesser entities, when
international society evaluates the right to secede. However, the prior existence of
a putative independent State as a federal unit likely makes proof of statehood eas-
ier. The putative State is accustomed to self-administration, and the political de-
sirability of independence has been tested during its federal existence. Other
States can approach the putative State with some confidence of its ability to exert
effective control over its territory. Duursma notes that the fifteen republics of the
USSR received recognition quickly, whereas Abkahzia, Chechnya, and South Os-
setia (lower-level entities within the Russian and Georgian republics) proved un-
able to establish independence, at least as a matter of international law.91 If a fed-
87. See HARRY R. STRAcK, SANCTIONS: TE CASE OF RHODESIA 2-3 (1978); Myres S.
McDougal & W. Michael Reisman, Rhodesia and the United Nations: The Lawfulness of
International Concern, 62 AM. J. INT'L L. 1, 3 (1968); J.E.S. Fawcett, Security Council
Resolutions on Rhodesia, 1995-96 BRiT. Y.B. INT'L L. 103, 112.
88. See Louis Cavar6, La Reconnaissance de l'Etat et le Mandchoukouo. XLII REvuE
GtN-RALE DE DRorr INT NATIONAL PUBLIC 5, 8-10 (1935); H.J. Timperley, Japan in Man-
chukuo, 24 FORE GN AxF. 295 (1934). It is not clear how many States recognized Manchu-
kuo. In his TBE BrTH oF NATIONS, Philip C. Jessup indicated that only four countries rec-
ognized Manchukuo: El Salvador, Germany, Hungary, and Italy. See Plutp C. JEssUP, Tim
BIRTH OF NATIONs 334 (1974). Another commentor, however, includes the Dominican Re-
public, Poland, and the Vatican. Mo SHEN, JAPAN IN MANCHURiA: AN ANALYTcAL STuDY
OF TPATmS AND DocuMErs 299-300 (1960).
89. DuuRSMA, supra note 1, at 92-96. The racially discriminatory rule, Duursma pro-
poses, might provide an exception. Id.
90. Id. Duursma offers Yugoslavia as the chief example. She also mentions the USSR.
Id. at 96-97.
91. Id. at 98-99. For the view that Chechnya possessed the attributes of a State, see
Hollis, supra note 86, at 793. Hollis proposes that recognition must be constitutive of
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eral unit is illegally annexed, it may achieve recognition more readily than other
federal units. But, again, Duursma emphasizes that it is not a legal rule which
produces this phenomenon. Concluding that no consistent practice has arisen
around secession, Duursma characterizes disputes over secession as largely politi-
cal. Reciprocal use of force by States and secessionists continues, though outside
international law. "The balance between the right of self-determination and the
inviolability of the State's territorial integrity has thus been struck not by a rule of
law, but by the law of the strongest, one of the first principles to be rejected by
international law."92 International law enters contests over secession only in con-
nection with minority rights, humanitarianism (i.e., the law governing the con-
duct of warfare), and uti possidetisjuris.93 A secession struggle ends only when
the secessionists quit or win international protection for their putative State.
94
Duursma concludes her discussion of self-determination by asksng whether the
principle has risen to the level ofjus cogens. Self-determination is, she writes,
statehood, for Chechnya had the internal attributes of a State, yet did not enjoy protection
under international law as a State. Chechbya ,as not widely recognized. Hollis reports that
Kuwait and Saudi Arabia alone took steps toward recognizing Chechn)y. Elswhere, how-
ever, it has been indicated that Azerbaijan, Estonia, Irun, Lithuania, and Turkey extended
recognition. Id.; see B. SZAmOWSK, ENCYCLOPAEDIA OF CovsFucIs Am FsINonrs IN
EASTEmNEuRoPE 63 (1993).
92. DuumsA, supra note 1, at 101. Duursma cites as evidence Eritrea, the Krajina (in
Croatia), Nagomo Karabakh, the Republika Srpska (in Bosnia-Herzegovina), and Chech-
nya. Id.
93. Id. at 101. This accords with Hollis on Chechnya. He identifies human rights law
as the most important contact point between the Chechen conflict and intermational law.
The hesitancy of the international community to address an internal Russian matter pre-
vented the UN from seizing itself of the issue. OSCE statements concerning the conduct of
warfare in Chechnya marked the maximum extent to which international law would reach
the crisis. Those statements addressed humanitarian concerns, not the issue of Chechen
self-determination. Note, however, that Crawford pointed out another contact between the
events in Checlnya and international law--namely, the conventional force reduction trea-
ties. International concern over Russian conduct in Chechna has referred to Russia's obli-
gations under the treaties to limit the number of certain weapons in Europ ean Russia. The
anti-secessionist campaign in Chechnya required Russia to deploy military resources in
excess of those permitted under the treaties. The Chechen conflict thus acquired a second
contact with international law.
94. DuumA, supra note 1, at 102. This last proposition is consistent with Duursna's
constitutivist leaning. One of the criticisms commonly leveled against constitutivism is that
it posits entities outside the protection of international law. If rights of statehood depend
on recognition, the unrecognized entity lies open to abuse. The declaratory view seems
more consistent with the contemporary emphasis on individual rights. The declaratory
view reasons that even absent recognition, an entity-or at least the people inhabiting it-
still enjoys the protections of international law. Duursma apparently steps avy from this
view. Territorial integrity of the secessionist entity, the author writes, is guaranteed only
after recognition. For the declaratist view, see 3I. BRiERLY, Tim Lxw oF NAmo-:s: ANr
bNTRoDucnIoN TO TE INrERNATIONAL LAWv OF PEAcE 139 (Sir Humphrey Waldock ed.,
1963).
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nonderogable with regard to Non-Self-Governing and Trust Territories and peo-
ples which form existing States.95 But self-determination is not jus cogens in
situations where self-determination will disrupt the territorial integrity of a State.
In such situations, Duursma posits that self-determination declines to an ordinary
norm of international law.
96
C. AUTONOMY
Duursma's conclusion about self-determination in turn raises another question:
if the principle of territorial integrity blocks the full exercise of self-
determination, what recourse does a people have when self-determination threat-
ens the territorial integrity of the parent State? Secession is not a right at interna-
tional law in such cases. The answer Duursma proposes is an intermediate one:
autonomy within the existing State. Such a solution would provide a people the
political basis for realizing a separate cultural identity, without threatening the
parent State. It would, according to Duursma, reduce the need for independent
statehood.
Duursma further posits that another factor may also reduce the need for inde-
pendence. As international law increasingly permeates domestic legal systems,
97
the human rights violations which so often in the past have provided impetus (if
not legal imprimatur) for secession may become increasingly rare. Duursma
writes:
It can be maintained that States which have accepted international legal control
over the implementation of minority rights and which have recognized the right
of individuals or groups of individuals to present claims concerning violations of
minority rights to an international judicial body are not legally obliged to give in
to secessional movements which justify their secession on the deprivation of the
group's human rights. The more effective international legal control on minority
rights becomes, the less justifiable a secession by reason of human rights violt-
tions.
9 8
Grants of internal autonomy may erode the State's minorities' claims to exter-
nal self-determination. This leads Duursma to question whether the history, eco-
nomics, and cultural matters cited by Croatia upon its secession from Yugoslavia
justified secession. An SFRY willing to concede broad autonomies to its constitu-
ent republics, in Duursma's view, would have immunized itself against seces-
95. DuuRsMA, supra note 1, at 102-03.
96. Id. at 103.
97. See Antonio Cassesse, Modern Constitutions and International Law, Ill REcumll
DES Cours (Hague Recueil) 331, 368-93 (discussing international law's influence on do-
mestic law) [hereinafter Cassese, REcuEm]; Vladen S. Vereschchetin, New Constitutions
and the Old Problem of the Relationship Between International and National Law, 7 EuR.
J. INT'LL. 29 (1996).




Duursma develops a procedure for autonomy and secession. Autonomy, she
proposes, should almost always precede full-fledged secession.100 Perhaps the
chief benefit of this procedure is that it delays the complicating effects of uti pos-
sidetis and thus may facilitate the pacific settlement of boundary disputes. Seces-
sion raises internal boundaries to international stature, and thus freezes in place
arrangements which may have better reflected administrative convenience than
minority rights.10 1 As an autonomous unit-but still part of the parent State--the
independence-leaning territory would have the chance to negotiate its boundaries
before the boundaries receive the special deference reserved for international
frontiers. A period of autonomy would also allow potential secessionists to experi-
ence the difficulties of self-administration. These difficulties might deter agitation
for separation from the State. Finally, if the secessionists continued their drift to-
ward independence, the period of autonomy would serve as a "training-wheel"
phase for statehood-a time to develop the cadres, political habits, and institu-
tions necessary to run a modem State.
The ideas summarized in the preceding two paragraphs are among Duursma's
most enticing and most problematic; enticing, because they suggest a peaceful ap-
paratus for satisfying the demands of national minorities; problematic, because,
arguably, that apparatus may work at cross-purposes which defeat it and the ideas
99. Id. at 106-07. Additionally, guarantees of autonomy must contain substance be-
yond their words for Duursma's legal mechanism to function fairly. The Yugoslav govern-
ment at the time of Slovenian and Croatian secession attempted to woo back the seces-
sionists by pledging increased autonomy within the SFRY. Pledges did not assuage the
secessionists' concern over observed federal practice. Marc Weller, The International Re-
sponse to the Dissolution of the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, 86 AM.. J. ITr'L
L. 569 (1992). The position of the province of Quebec may provide a better example of
how a parent State can guarantee minority rights and thereby reduce or eliminate legal
grounds for secession. See James Crawford, Report: State Practice and International Law
in Relation to Unilateral Secession, Canadian Dep't of Justice Report, Feb. 19, 1997 (in-
terpreting state practice as not constructing a right to unilateral secession) (copy on file
withAm. U. J. INT'LL. & PoL'Y).
100. See CASSESE, supra note 6, at 120 (proposing that secession should only be a last
resort, after attempts at alternative arrangements have failed).
101. DuuRsmA, supra note 1, at 108. In this regard, Duursma draws attention to an in-
strument perhaps not familiar to all readers, the European Charter of Local Self-
Government. With sixteen parties, the Charter requires local consultation before internal
boundaries change. This rule acquires a special relevance in view of the difficulties caused
in the space of the former Soviet Union by inter-republican and sub-republican boundaries
drawn up without reference to local wishes. The Yugoslav crisis also comes to mind as a
lesson in boundary-drawing. On Soviet internal boundaries, their origins, and some of the
problems they pose, see CENTRAL ASIA AND TIE CAucAsus AFm THE SOVIET UNION:
Dom _msc AND nom DYmucs (Mohiaddin Misbahi ed., 1994); FRom UNmoN To
Coi ONwsALTm NATIONALISM AND SEPARATIsM IN Tim SOVIET REmUBMcs (Gail W. Lapi-
dus & Victor Zaslavsky eds., 1992); Patrick Cockbum, Dateline USSR. Ethnic Tremors,
74 FoREicNPoL'y 168 (1989).
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may be predicated on trends in international society which ultimately transmog-
rify the issue of self-determination and secession.
Duursma justifies her proposed procedural rule on the proposition that it both
respects territorial integrity and makes statehood easier in the event that the
autonomous entity finally chooses a course of complete separation. If this is the
inner-working of Duursma's autonomy apparatus, then that mechanism works at
cross-purposes with itself. The operative decision-makers in a State are unlikely to
view a device which facilitates the complete independence of an entity within that
State as conducive to the maintenance of territorial integrity. If the goal of auton-
omy is to secure territorial integrity, then an effect which Duursma claims for
autonomy-i.e., preparation of the autonomous unit for international person-
hood-runs contrary to that goal.
Of equal concern is a trend in international society, which Duursma identifies
as critical to contemporary self-determination and secession law. Autonomy, she
posits, will become more common as human rights principles permeate internal
order and thus obviate claims to complete independence. 102 Indeed, international
human rights law appears to be spreading to domestic arenas through covenants
such as the ICCPR and ICESCR, regional arrangements such as the ECHR and
OSCE, and admission of a greater role for international society in enforcing prin-
ciples such as democracy.' 03 Other phenomena, once restricted to the domestic
realm, however, are simultaneously undergoing internationalization as well. Eco-
nomic and trade controls number most prominently among these (consider the
EU, NAFTA, and GATIh. As the internationalization of human rights law may
be changing the landscape of the law of secession, the internationalization of eco-
nomic and trade controls may be changing the landscape of the politics and eco-
nomics of secession. An internationalized human rights regime may spread con-
ditions conducive to human dignity into all the countries of the world, and the
establishment of such conditions may moot calls for independence. Human rights
law, in short, has the potential to reduce occurrences of secessionist ambition.
Economics once did the same. The insular character of economic and trade law,
indeed, long presented one of the biggest impediments to secession. A small entity
could little afford divorce from the trade zone formed by its parent State. The
chilly prospects of independent economic life deterred secession. Under the new
regimes of economics and trade, however, secession may carry much less adverse
political-economic consequence than it has historically. An independent Scotland,
Corsica, Catalonia, or Wales still inside the EU (or a Quebec still inside NAFTA)
would experience change in its material circumstance from the days of incorpora-
tion under a larger nation State, but the change may well be judged manageable.
102. See supra notes 97-99 and accompanying text (discussing human rights in relation
to an international legal order).
103. On the status of democracy in international law, see James Crawford, Democracy
in International Law, 1994 BRrr. Y.B. INT'L L. 113, 116-130; Olivier Corten, La Rdsolu-
tion 940 du Conseil de Sdcuritd Autorisant une Intervention Militaire en Harti:
l 'dmergence d'un Principe de Ldgitimitd Ddmocratique en Droit International? 6 EuR. J.
Irr'LL. 116 (1995).
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The political-economic result of an internationalizing society may not in all situa-
tions push in the same direction as the legal result International human rights
law may remove one of the reasons to seek independence; international economic
and trade regimes may remove one of the most effective barriers to independence.
Duursma concludes that certain rules have arisen to endorse self-determinatioa
and territorial integrity separately, but what is lacking is a rule to mediate the two
conflicting principles. She proposes autonomy as a mechanism to fill this gap.
Whether such a mechanism would work remains uncertain.
D. CRITERIA FOR STATEHOOD
'Much as she parsed through the UN and other practice relating to the term
"self-determination," Duursma conducts an exhaustive analysis of the concept of
the State. Particularly welcome is the author's critical survey of the Montevideo
statehood criteria. The Montevideo Convention on the Rights and Duties of
States 104 enumerated four criteria, which quickly came to be a near-talismanic
reference105 in discussions of statehood: (1) permanent population; (2) defined
territory; (3) effective government; and (4) capacity to enter into relations with
other States. Duursma notes scholarly dissatisfaction with the criteria, and she
documents subsequent efforts to codify a better definition of statehood.106 None
succeeded. From 1949 onward, the International Law Commission (ILC) had a
list of fourteen topics deemed to require codification. 10 7 Statehood and recogni-
tion numbered among these, but because they "raised many political problems
which did not lend themselves to regulations by law," the ILC never taclded the
issues.108 A Special Rapporteur participating in the drafting of the Declaration on
the Rights and Duties of States had earlier characterized the definition offered by
the Montevideo Convention as problematic, but political concerns seem to have
later prevented the ILC from formulating a new definition.10 9 The drafting ses-
sions for the 1969 Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties,110 discussions in
particular of a draft Article 6 of the 1969 Convention,111 and discussions of draft
Articles on Succession of States in respect of Treaties1 2 witnessed efforts to cod-
ify the definition of statehood and guidelines for recognition. Again, agreement
proved elusive, and statehood and recognition remained uncodified. Like others
104. 165 L.N.T.S. 19; 28 Am. I IT'LL (Supp.) 53 (1934).
105. Citation to the Montevideo criteria is widespread. See, ag., RoziYr Ions,
PaoBUis AND PRocEss: Thim noN' AL LAW Am How Ws UsE IT 39 (1994), BRowvam,
supra note 7, at 72-73.
106. DuuRsiA, supra note 1, at 112-13
107. Id.
108. Id.
109. DummA, supra note 1, at 113 (citing 1 Y.B. hIT Co.,'N 61, § 69, U.N. Dec.
AICN.4/Ser.A/1949).
110. 2 Y.B INT'L COS',N 107, § 4, U.N. Doe. AICN.4/Ser.A/1956.
111. 2 Y.B INT'L COM-'N 192, § 38, U.N. Doe. A(CN.4/Ser.A/1966.
112. 1 Y.B INT'LCOM'N 19, § 76, U.N. Doe. A/CN.4/Ser.A/1974.
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before,113 Duursma has been left to propose a definition of statehood with the
Montevideo Convention as the sole (and limited) guide among multilateral legal
instruments.
Duursma's discussion of the requirements that an entity, in order to be a State,
possess a territory and a population attached to that territory is distinctive in its
focus on the factor of size. Diminutiveness does not seem to matter in assessing
whether a putative State has a territory and a population. 114 The author's discus-
sion of the requirement of effective government is more interesting. The require-
ment of effective government, Duursma posits, varies with the degree to which an
entity's claim to statehood faces challenge. Secessionists heavily opposed by the
metropolitan State may need to demonstrate a heightened degree of effectiveness
over the territory they claim. Duursma notes that a presumption of continuity of
effective power survives invasion, civil war, and even occupation. 115 Developing
a strand of thought on federal States begun earlier in her discussion of seces-
sion, 116 Duursma proposes that federal States are more apt to lose effective con-
trol over their federal units than centralized States are over parts of their terri-
tory.11 7 The Badinter Commission, it is noted, placed little burden on Croatia to
prove the attainment of effective control over its territory, despite strenuous efforts
by the SFRY to retain that constituent republic of the federation. 118 Duursma
characterizes this result as a product of the political position enjoyed by federal
units;119 the author denies a legal aspect to the federal advantage. It seems odd,
however, to attribute no legislative effect to the opinions of the Badinter Commis-
sion.120 Scholars should consider the possibility that State practice surrounding
113. See CRAwFoRD, supra note 7, at 110.
114. DuuRsMA, supra note 1, at 116-18.
115. See CRAWFORD, supra note 7, at 77-79 (noting that States annexed from 1936 to
1940 continued to enjoy legal personality even though their governments lost all territorial
power); see also ALExARND-CHARLES Kiss, RPERTOmE DE LA PRATIQIQUE FRANQAIs3 DE
DRorr ITERNATIONAL PUBLIC 11 26-31, at 18-22 (1965) (citing earlier French practice in
which France recognized Poland and Czechoslovakia as "nations" during World War I).
Though Poland had once been a State, the Polish National Committee headquartered at
Paris which benefited by the recognition could make no claim of continuity with a State
which had disappeared from the map of Europe in 1815. Id. The recognized entities had no
territory, yet the act "recognized their right to raise an army, to have a national flag, to
have military tribunals authorized to judge their nationals." 1d.
116. See supra notes 91-92 and accompanying text (discussing the lack of consistent
practice around secession).
117. DuuRsMA, supra note 1, at 118-19.
118. See Yugoslavia Arbitration No. 1, supra note 45.
119. See DuunsMA, supra note 1, at 199.
120. See Alain Pellet, The Opinions of the Badinter Arbitration Committee: A Second
Breath for the Self-Determination of Peoples, 3 EuR. J. INT'L. L. 178 (1992) (noting that
the author, Pellet, a professor at University of Paris X and the IEP (Paris), is a member of
the Commission of International Law and drafted much of the Commission's work product
in his capacity of legal advisor to the Badinter Commission); Pellet, Note Str la Commis-
sion d 'Arbitrage de la Confdrence Europdene Pour la Paix en Yugoslavie, 37 ANNuAME
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the breakup of Yugoslavia produced a pressure toward greater international legal
status for federal Units.
121
Like her discussion of territory and population, Duursma's analysis of inde-
pendence approaches the requirement of statehood from an angle especially rele-
vant to the European Micro-States. All five of the Micro-States display what
larger States would likely regard as serious compromises of their independence.
Duursma is at pains to characterize the various treaties and customary arrange-
ments eroding the Micro-States' discretion in a way which leaves their independ-
ence intact,122 and conversely, she characterizes independence as broadly as pos-
sible, in order to permit several apparent derogations of the Micro-States'
autonomy. A good deal of precedent does support the proposition that a State may,
without sacrificing independence, pledge to do or refrain from things which ordi-
narily lie within its discretion123 Nevertheless, Duursma must concede that there
exist questions of independence of special concern to Micro-States.
Micro-States face problems stemming from their smallness, lack of raw mate-
rials, and historical relationships to larger neighbors. 12 4 Duursma posits that the
various expedients to which Micro-States resort in their international relations are
not a priori prejudicial to independence. Thus, Micro-States do not compromise
their statehood by practical collaboration in the areas of postal service, education,
broadcasting, telecommunications, and customs controls, nor by economic coop-
eration and political cooperation, including delegating defense and diplomatic
representation to their neighboring State or States. 125 Duursma notes that Micro-
States are susceptible to legal or military coercion, but she does not characterize
this weakness as a derogation from independence. Under the principle of ex inju-
riajus non oritur, such illegal action has no legal effect and thus does not dero-
gate a Micro-State's formal independence. 126
Taken singly, these factors may not merit much concern, but the Micro-States
are subject at once to almost all the limitations which Duursma discusses. With
such large areas of activity excised from their competence, the Micro-States may
suffer a substantial derogation, if not of independence, per se, then of some other
FRANgIS DE Dnorr NT'L [A.F.D.L] 329 (1991); Matthew C.R. Craven, The European
CommunityArbitration Commission on Yugoslavia, 1995 BRrT. Y.B. INT'LL. 333.
121. See Peter Savigear, Autonomy and the Unitary State: the Case of Corsica. in
FaDEIA NDNATIONALIS 96-112 (Murray Forsyth ed. 1989) (discussing the possible
growth of the international status of federal units); Robert Senelle, Constitutional Reform
in Belgium: From Unitarism Towards Federalism, in FEDERALISM AND NATio0 sM, su-
pra, at 51-54. Both Savigear and Senelle point out that modest competences in external
relations have been delegated to subunits or regions of certain European States.
122. See infra notes 137-269 and accompanying text (discussing Duursma's five case
studies).
123. DuuRsMA, supra note 1, at 121 (citing the classic Wimbledon 1923 P.C.IJ. and the
Austro-German Customs Union 1931 P.C.L. cases).
124. Id. at 125.
125. Id. at 125-26.
126. Id. at 125-27.
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perhaps less tangible aspect of statehood. Duursma repeatedly emphasizes that,
with the exception of Monaco, the Micro-States retain the ability to exit the trea-
ties and conventions under which they have assigned responsibilities to neigh-
boring States. She also emphasizes that it is a serious challenge to their independ-
ence that some of the Micro-States lack access to judicial process through which
to settle disputes between themselves and those States with which they are most
closely associated.
127
The focus on exit options and judicial process may, however, overlook an ele-
ment of statehood not always described as such. States perform certain functions,
which are, for lack of a better expression, characteristically state-like. So long as
it may cancel the arrangement unilaterally, a State does not derogate its inde-
pendence by, for example, assigning diplomatic responsibilities to another State.
But, by such an assignment, the assigning State disengages itself from one of the
signal activities of a State. One or two such acts of disengagement may not mat-
ter, but the Micro-States, as will be seen, do few of the things generally associated
with statehood on their own, or, insofar as they do such things, they do them at a
de minimus level. Certainly, a State consists in a bundle of rights, and these rights
are still held by the Micro-States after they have delegated various functions to
other States (provided the delegation is done through treaties which the Micro-
States may denounce). Statehood, however, might also consist in activities. If a
State is only an assortment of discretions or competences, then statehood could be
vested in an entity recognized by international society as possessing those discre-
tions or competences, even if it had no real capacities or contracted away its func-
tions to others. The requirements of territory and population make apparent that
statehood is more than a collection of abstract rights. Statehood is also concrete
power over a segment of the earth's landmass and the permanent presence of a
people. Can we properly speak of statehood absent most of the activities generally
thought of as state-like? The question is a particularly sensitive one for Micro-
States.
Duursma rounds off setting the stage with a brief discussion of a quintessential
state-like activity, participation in international organizations.
E. MICRO-STATES AND INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS
"To admit all the bits and pieces of former empires as independent States,"
wrote D.W. Wainhouse in 1964, "would not only debase the coinage of member-
ship, but would surely be more than the UN structure could bear,"128 Widespread
concern at the governmental level over the multiplicity of small entities seeking
UN membership appears to have begun in 1965 with the debate over admission of
the Maldive Islands. Article 4, paragraph 1 of the UN Charter provides that
Member States should be "willing and able" to discharge the duties of UN mem-
127. Id. at 127.
128. D. W. WArtuouss, RBmNANTS OF EwiRE: THE UNITED NATIONS AND THE END OF
CoLoNLALIsM 134 (1964), quoted in DtuRSMA, supra note 1, at 134.
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bership. A UN Committee of Experts convened in 1969 to study the possibility of
alternative membership for very small entities. The Committee met eleven times
and produced an Interim Report in June 1970, but no special UN membership
category was established. The Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization
(UNESCO) and the Food and Agricultural Organization (FAO) amended their
constitutions to allow Non-Self-Governing Territories to belong, but no corre-
sponding change was made in the UN Charter. Nevertheless, the 1990s witnessed
the admission of seven very small entities into the UN: Liechtenstein (September
18, 1990), Micronesia (September 17, 1991), the Marshall Islands (September 17,
1991), San Marino (March 2, 1992), Monaco (May 28, 1993), Andorra (July 28,
1993), and Palau (December 15, 1994).129
The issue of Micro-States in international organizations leads Duursma to in-
troduce a problematic formulation about law and politics. Duursma emphasizes
that international law has not barred Micro-State membership. According to
Duursma, the League of Nations never excluded Micro-States on grounds of law,
though it also never admitted any Micro-States. 130 The impediments to member-
ship, she argues, have been the practical limitations inherent in diminutiveness
and politics. "[Tihe statehood of the Micro-States is not disputed, but the interna-
tional community is not prepared to accord them rights which would permit them
to exercise a disproportionate political influence on international affairs." 131 This
formulation, as will be seen, recurs throughout Duursma's case studies of the five
European Micro-States. 13 2 It is problematic in the way data is classified. Data
which runs against the statehood of Micro-States is classified as political, whereas
data in favor of statehood is deemed legal. This formulation thus fosters a selec-
tive analysis of State practice. For example, Duursma discusses treaties which
limit the external autonomy of the Micro-States. These, she argues, are contrary to
the UN Charter, Article 2, paragraph 1, which guarantees the sovereign equality
of States, and thus such treaties "can have no legal effect" within the United Na-
tions.133 But State practice reveals data contrary to this proposition. Belarus and
the Ukraine were bound, under the Soviet Constitution, to follow policy set by the
USSR. The two republics, nonetheless, enjoyed UN membership. Duursma dis-
misses the Belaussian and Ukrainian cases as "a package deal based on political
considerations." 134 Perhaps she is right to categorize admission of the two Soviet
republics as political and without legislative effect on international law. But closer
cases, arising in connection with the Micro-States, may be a different matter.
In fairness, there does exist a real divide between political action and legal
rules. But that divide is often blurry. As such, a taxonomy that categorizes action
129. DuRsmiA, supra note 1, at 138 n.33.
130. Id. at 133-34 (noting further that micro-states could request alternative member-
ship).
131. Id. at 139.
132. See infra notes 137-269 and accompanying text (discussing in detail the five case
studies).
133. DuumaMA, supra note 1, at 140.
134. Id. at 140 n.42.
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as either "legal" or "political" may obscure more than it explains. Decisions dic-
tated by politics can be instrumental in shaping the expectations of operative deci-
sion makers as to what conduct is legal. The State actions that legislate interna-
tional law are often influenced by politics. Declining to attribute legislative effect
to actions of a political nature, therefore, can produce an incomplete description
of the law.
11. STUDIES IN SMALLNESS
"Micro-States," Duursma writes, "have been obliged to regulate their inde-
pendence in a certain way." 135 The nature and extent of this regulation occupies
Duursma through the five case studies, which constitute the body of the book. 136
A. LIECHTENSTEIN
The Principality of Liechtenstein, the subject of Duursma's study possessing
the soundest footing in terms of statehood criteria, has had throughout its history
a close relationship to its neighbors, Switzerland and Austria. A constitutional
monarchy, Liechtenstein has a Diet,137 provisions for referenda, and a Crown
Prince, currently Hans-Adam II.138 As head of State, the Prince can initiate leg-
islation, as can the Diet and referenda. The Prince at his own or the Diet's initia-
tive can dismiss parliament.
139
All of the courts that serve the Principality lie within its borders, though three
of eight "sole judges" are Austrian. 140 Some prison sentences are served in Swiss
cantonal jails.141 International human rights law has substantially entered Liech-
tenstein's domestic legal system. 142 This transparency to international law makes
Liechtenstein a model for Duursma's proposition that the Micro-State can exert a
stabilizing-and legalizing-influence on international society. Duursma down-
plays as a political expedient the fact that non-nationals living in the Principality
suffer some legal disabilities: over thirty per cent of the inhabitants are aliens, and
Liechtenstein, like the other Micro-States, must take steps to protect its own na-
135. Id. at 145.
136. See supra notes 4-6 and accompanying text (developing the background for the
critique of Duursma's analysis).
137. The Diet is Liechtenstein's Parliament.
138. DuuRsMA, supra note 1, at 150.
139. Id. at 151-53.
140. Id. at 154.
141. Id. at 155 (explaining that punishments in criminal cases exceeding six months
will be served in Swiss prisons).
142. Id. at 156-58 (noting that the entry of international human rights norms included
Liechtenstein's accession to various human rights conventions and constitutional amend-
ments such as that of 1984 granting women the vote). Broadly accepted rules, such as
those against money laundering, have also joined Liechtensteinese law. Id. at 190 n.284.
To further demonstrate its commitment to international law, Liechtenstein has taken the
lead at the UN proposing autonomy for minorities in States. Id. at 198.
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tionals from economic, and perhaps cultural, inundation. In any event, under the
European Economic Area Agreement, Liechtenstein will have to equalize the le-
gal situation as between nationals and aliens from the European Union (EU) and
EFTA countries.
143
Like the other Micro-States, Liechtenstein's foreign policy focuses on preserv-
ing its independence and statehood, obtaining membership in international or-
ganizations, and intensifying and broadening its diplomatic contacts while keep-
ing the expense of statecraft modest. Neutrality is also a key Liechtensteinese
policy.144 "Independently of other political factors which might have influenced
Liechtenstein's survival as a neutral State during both World Wars, it is evident
that its neutrality was indispensable in order to stay outside the conflict." 145 By
this, Duursma means that the scrupulous maintenance of a legal status of neutral-
ity was instrumental to Liechtenstein's survival. As noted above, the author in-
sistently posits a distinction between political and legal factors. It is, however, de-
batable whether the politics, which worked to the Principality's advantage, ought
to be so readily characterized as independent from the legal situation. Legal neu-
trality did not save Denmark, Norway, or the Benelux countries.
The most serious questions as to this Micro-State's contemporary independ-
ence surround its relations with Switzerland. Though it accredits ambassadors to
Austria, Belgium, the Holy See, and Switzerland, and maintains diplomatic or
consular relations with fifty-three States, Liechtenstein hosts no foreign resident
ambassadors. 146 It does, however, send its own representatives to conferences and
keeps representatives at some international organizations. 147 The bulk of Liech-
tenstein's diplomatic contact is through the Swiss diplomatic corps. Duursma em-
phasizes that Swiss management of Liechtenstein's foreign relations takes place
strictly on a case-by-case basis, and the Principality thus retains legal discretion
over its external contact.148 Similarly, a Canadian sits as the Liechtensteinese
judge on the European Court of Human Rights 149 but can be replaced at Liechten-
stein's discretion. Switzerland negotiates all postal matters on Liechtenstein's be-
halfX but Liechtenstein can obtain arbitration of a postal agreement it dislikes.
150
Under a Customs Union with Switzerland, all customs legislation passed in Bern
and all customs treaties entered into between Switzerland and third States are in
force over Liechtenstein, and Liechtenstein's Value Added Tax case appeals go to
the Swiss Federal Court Liechtenstein is somewhat protected in this arena be-
cause it is free to terminate the Customs Union upon one year's notice.151 Under a
Monetary Union, all Swiss banking law applies in Liechtenstein and monetary
143. Duum A, supra note 1, at 159.
144. Id. at 160.
145. Id. at 160.
146. Id. at 162.
147. Id.
148. Id. at 161-63.
149. DuummsA, supra note 1, at 162-63.
150. Id. at 163 & 163 n.107.
151. Id. at 164-66.
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and banking cases on final instance go to the Swiss Court of Cassation. Liechten-
stein is also a Swiss franc zone to the exclusion of a Liechtenstein currency,
which Liechtenstein has agreed to be barred from creating. Again, Liechtenstein
may withdraw from the Union and obtain arbitration of disputes with Switzerland
arising thereunder. 152 Finally, a decision by Switzerland to expel an alien controls
over Liechtensteinese territory as well. 153 In one exception to the assignment of
functions to Switzerland, Liechtenstein, which has not had an army since the dis-
solution of the German Federation in 1866, does not belong to the Swiss defense
system.1
54
Duursma does not view this broad deputizing of Switzerland as a derogation of
Liechtensteinese statehood. Rejection of the Principality's application for League
of Nations membership is a case in point. According to Duursma, political con-
cerns over managerial capacity and resources, not legal hurdles, kept Liechten-
stein out of the League:
At the time of the discussions on Liechtenstein's admission to the League of Na-
tions... it could hardly be maintained that Liechtenstein had delegated many
attributes of its sovereignty to other Powers .... The true reason for the non-
admission of Liechtenstein was its smallness, not its deputation of some sover-
eign attributes by reason of its smallness.
155
This formulation again raises the question whether statehood survives habitual
passivity in areas of key state-like functions. Duursma does acknowledge, without
substantial exploration, that some juridical arguments were presented against
Liechtenstein's League of Nation's application. 156 Putting these aside, there re-
mains the reality that politics and facts interact with the law. In international law,
the expectations of operative decision-makers as to what conduct is permissible, in
at least some part, determines juridical rules. Duursma's resort to a law-politics
distinction too easily removes critical problems facing a Micro-State's interna-
tional personality.
Duursma's support for Liechtenstein's international status is most convincing
in its exhaustive description of the Principality's ultimately successful drive for
membership in international organizations: admission to the International Court
of Justice (ICJ) Statute in 1950 over Soviet objections,1 57 participation in the
152. Id. at 166.
153. Id. at 168.
154. Id. at 169.
155. DuuRsMA, supra note 1, at 172-73.
156. See id. at 173 n.185.
157. Id. at 175-77. "A review of the economic and political situation of Liechtenstien
would show that it had never been an independent state .... It had formed a customs un-
ion with Switzerland, which country took care of Liechtenstein's post and telegraph service




Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE) process; 158 admission
to the Council of Europe in 1978;159 and, accession to and participation in the
European Free Trade Association (EFTA).160 But, as will be suggested later, the
reliance on international organization membership as evidence of statehood poses
problems of its own.
16 1
B. SAN MARINO
Surrounded on all sides by Italian territory, the Republic of San Marino, ac-
cording to some, is the oldest continually functioning democracy. 162 Its long de-
votion to the right of asylum cost it invasion at the hands of a Papacy pursuing
renegades,163 but may have saved it from integration into the new Italian State in
1861. San Marino had given refuge to Italian nationalists in the 1850s, and after
unification, the leaders of the new State respected the Republic's ancient inde-
pendence.
164
The Republic is governed by institutions that can trace their roots at least four
centuries back.16 5 A Great and General Council holds legislative power, and its
sixty members appoint the State Congress, San Marino's government.1 65 The
Council also appoints the Heads of State, called the "Captains Regent," who hold
office for six-month terms. 167 During their terms, the Captains Regent cannot re-
sign and must concur to pass decrees. 168 Duursma identifies these rules as left-
overs from government structures common in the early middle ages.169 A "Coun-
cil of Twelve," chosen from the Great and General Council, have some judicial
competence, while an assembly of the heads of families, called the "Arengo,"
7 0
seems a vestigial organ. Legislative initiative lies with the State Congress, the
Council, every constituent commune, and with the general citizenry.17 ' Judges
are appointed for renewable four-year terms by the Great and General Council
158. Id. at 178 (noting that the Soviet Union did not question Liechtenstein's legal
statehood, only its independence).
159. Id. at 182-84.
160. Id. at 184-86.
161. See infra notes 221-251 and accompanying text (discussing the tensions of estab-
lishing statehood).
162. Duumm, supra note 1, at 208 (presenting an ancient legend that dates the
founding of San Marino to 301 AD).
163. Id. at208-09.
164. Id. at 209-10,223.




168. DuuRsmA, supra note 1, at 212.
169. Id.
170. Id. at213.
171. Id. at 211-14 (noting that any sixty San Marino nationals can petition for a draft
law to be presented).
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and cannot be San Marino nationals, unless at least fifty-nine of the Council
members vote to confirm them. 172 Removal for political cause is possible, raising
doubts over independence of the judiciary. 173 San Marino has no civil code, but
rather an admixture of common law, cannon law, ancient Roman law, codes
known as the Statutes of 1600, and "ordinary law."174 One wonders whether pos-
session of a distinctive legal system can be an element of peoplehood. Duursma
does not suggest this, but the peculiarity of some Micro-State legal systems raises
the possibility.
Like Liechtenstein, San Marino readily admits international human rights
standards into its law. The Republic is a State party to the ICCPR, ICESCR,
European Commission an Human Rights (ECHR), and the Convention on the
Rights of the Child. 175 It files reports, pursuant to ICCPR Article 40, paragraph
1, and guarantees universal franchise. Given the transparency of the Republic to
international legal norms, the concern seems unwarranted, as expressed by a
member of the ICCPR Human Rights Conunittee, that the ICCPR might be
treated as legally inferior to the San Marinese constitution.1 76 A more serious
matter raised by the Committee is the provision that San Marinese generally can-
not serve as judges.1
77
San Marino is a neutral State, though this status remained unwritten until
1971.178 Nonetheless, San Marino has not been at war since 1462,179 This history
172. Id. at 214.
173. Id. at 214-15 & n.52 (explaining that the judiciary is "guaranteed by law"),
174. DuuRSMA, supra note 1 at 215 n.60.
175. Id. at 218.
176. Id. at 217-19. Such concern is misplaced in a more general respect. Other coun-
tries demonstrating some readiness to effectuate international norms in municipal law have
expressly subordinated international conventions to the national constitution. See Malach-
tou v. Armefti and Armefti 88 I.L.R. 199, 205 (Cyprus 1987) (noting that the Supreme
Court of Cyprus in addressing the relation between the European Convention on the Legal
Status of Children Born out of Wedlock to the municipal law of Cyprus, judged the Con-
vention inferior to the Cypriot Constitution). At the same time, the Court applied the Con-
vention to the case at bar. Id.; see also Pavlou v. Chief Returning Officer, Mayor of Nico-
sia, 86 I.L.R. 109, 114 (Cyprus 1987) (noting an example of a petitioner claiming that
ratification of the ICCPR and the 1958 Convention on Discrimination "were superior to all
of domestic Cypriot laws with the exception of the Constitution"). The Court dismissed the
petition, noting that Cypriot law did not contravene the treaties. Id.; see also Vienna Con-
vention on the Law of Treaties, UNGAOR, 24th Sess., U.N. Doc. A/CONF. 39/27 art. 46
(1969). This convention provides:
[A State] may not invoke the fact that its consent to be bound by a treaty has been expressed in viola-
tion of a provision of its internal law regarding competence to conclude treaties as invalidating its
consent unless that violation was manifest and concerned a rule of its Internal law of fundamental
importance.
Id. (emphasis added).
177. Duu sMA supra note 1, at 220. For discussion of this aspect, see infra text accom-
panying notes 299-301 (analyzing the judicial structure of the five case studies).
178. DUiRsMA, supra note 1, at 222.
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amplifies doubt over Duursma's formulation regarding Liechtensteinese neutral-
ity.180 If it was legally formalized neutrality that saved Liechtenstein from the
World Wars, what protected San Marino before 1971?
Duursma identifies neutrality, reinforcement of international status, and con-
tribution to international problem-solving as the focus of San Marinese foreign
policy.18 1 A sometimes-rocky relationship with Italy reached a low point when,
between 1949 and 1951, Italy placed customs controls around the Republic.
1 2
San Marino had construed the 1939 Treaty of Friendship with Italy as permitting
San Marino to operate gambling casinos. Italy interpreted the Treaty's bar against
fiscal measures deleterious to Italy as reaching casinos. 183 San Marino ended the
gambling, to Italy's satisfaction, and the quasi-blockade was lifted. Duursma does
not consider this episode evidence that San Marinese independence is compro-
mised by its relationship to Italy.
184
Recalling Swiss-Liechtensteinese relations, a number of arrangements deputize
Italy to carry on State functions for San Marino. With various distinctions from
Liechtenstein, San Marino defers to Italy on postal matters,1 85 television and ra-
dio regulations,18 6 the monetary system, 1 7 and bank competition law.188 Duur-
sma emphasizes that San Marino is paid by Italy for limiting its activity in the
broadcasting sphere, but this does not answer questions as to what range of ac-
tivities an entity may eschew before its passivity begins to erode its character as a
State. Duursma correctly points out that San Marino, as evidenced by the pay-
ments and other benefits it receives from Italy, retains rights to do the things an
entity must be free to do in order to be a State.18 9 But might the entity actually
have to do some threshold quantity of such things? Considering that for a fee, San
Marino has agreed not to issue currency, levy customs duties, cultivate tobacco,
establish gaming houses, or adopt other fiscal measures "deleterious" to Italy, 190
the question is a serious one. 191
179. Id. at222.
180. See supra note 142 and accompanying text (discussing the adoption of various
laws into Liechtenstein's domestic legal system).
181. DUURSmA, supra note 1, at 222-23.
182. Id. at 225.
183. Id. (noting that Italy also doubted whether San Marino's liberal divorce laws were
consistent with the Treaty of Friendship).
184. Id. at 227,258.
185. Id. at 228-29.
186. Id. at231.
187. DuuRsiA, supra note 1, at231-33.
188. Id. at 231-32.
189. Id. at 255-59.
190. Id. at230n.61.
191. To the Republic's credit, it does maintain some interesting areas of independent
action. The Council of Twelve has exclusive control over the granting of residence permits,
and, perhaps in an artifact of the Republic's ancient tradition of asylum, persons expelled
from Italy are free to enter San Marino. Id. at 230-31. Geography might limit the meaning-
fulness of this particular allowance. San Marino has no airport, thus one can only reach it
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San Marino gained admission to the Statute of the ICJ in 1953, and the Com-
mittee of Experts evaluating San Marino at that time raised no questions as to its
statehood or independence.1 92 The Republic participated in the birth of the OSCE
at Helsinki in 1972.193 The FAO, by contrast with the ICJ and OSCE, did not
admit San Marino, out of concern that the diminutive State would have difficulty
meeting the obligations of membership. 194 UNESCO also declined admission in
1947, but admitted San Marino in 1974 without debate. 195 In parallel fashion, the
World Health Organization rejected San Marino in 1948-49 for the State's fiscal
limitations but admitted the Republic in 1980.196 WHO cited San Marino's inter-
national status as a problem in the late forties; Duursma emphasizes the fiscal im-
pediments. 197 When the ILO admitted San Marino in 1983 (reversing a 1950s
rejection), it sought assurances from the Republic on financial capacity. 198 Only
its application to the Council of Europe appears to have prompted explicitly legal
analysis of the entity's status. 199 Council rapporteurs queried whether San Marino
is a State.20 0 Recognition by States, Duursma concludes, was decisive in the rap-
porteurs' finding that San Marino constitutes a State. After this finding, the Re-
public joined the Council of Europe in 1988.201 The Republic also is in a customs
union with the EU and has observer status in EU institutions. 202 Acquisition of
this status evidently was eased by San Marino's promise not to make itself a tax
haven.20 3 It seems fair to ask whether, by undertaking to harmonize its tax law
with the EU, San Marino received dignities, which if premised on the virtues of
its legal status alone, it would have been denied. At the very least, if membership
in the EU and other international organizations is a cornerstone of San Marino's
international legal status, then the connection is well-illustrated between politics
and law: admission to those bodies depended upon political concession and, once
achieved, generated legal rights. Politics does seem to contribute to the interna-
tional status of the Micro-State.
C. MONACO
The Principality of Monaco has been at least nominally ruled by the Grimaldis,
a family from the Guelph faction in Genoa, for most of the time since 1297.204
travelling by land through Italian territory. Id. at 231.
192. DuuRSMA, supra note 1, at 235.
193. Id. at 235-36.
194. Id. at 237-38.
195. Id. at 238-39.
196. Id. at239-40.
197. DUURSMA, supra note 1, at 239-40.
198. Id. at242.
199. Id. at 242-46.
200. Id. at 243.
201. Id. at 245.
202. DUuRSMA, supra note 1, at 246.
203. Id. at 247.
204. Id. at 262-64.
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The 1.95 square kilometers which compose Monaco are surrounded on all but
their seaward side by the French d6partement of Alpes-Maritimes. 20 5 Monaco
was traded as a protectorate from Spain, to France, to Sardinia, and, arguably,
back to France.20 6 From a treaty with France, to which Monaco acceded in 1861,
Monaco gave up the right to place itself under the protection of any power besides
France.20 7 The basis of Franco-Mondgasque relations at present are a Treaty of
July 1918 and a Convention of July 1 9 3 0 .
20S These two instruments set out much
of the onstitutive structure of the Principality. 20 9 The Prince Regnant (Rainier HI
since 1949) shares executive power with the government, which consists of a
Minister of State and three Government Counsellors. 2 10 In theory, these are ap-
pointed by the Prince and dismissed by the Prince and are not responsible to par-
liament.21 1 In fact, the Minister of State must be selected from three candidates
proposed by France, and one Government Counsellor is similarly French-
nominated.2 12 These two officials cannot be Mondgasque nationals and usually
belong to the French diplomatic corps.2 13 Various other civil and police officials
in Monaco are also French-appointed and of French nationality.2 14 For the term
of their service to the government of the Principality, officials belonging to the
structure of the French civil service are seconded to Monaco.2 15 The Minister of
State's signature is required to pass a Ministerial Decree. The parliament, the
Conseil National, consists of delegates elected by universal and direct suffrage.
Delegates cannot be Government Counsellors or members of the royal house-
hold.2 16 The Prince alone initiates legislation, but a draft law goes no further
without approval of the Minister of State.
2 17
Like the government, the Mondgasque judiciary by terms of the 1930 Conven-
tion contains substantial foreign elements.2 18 A majority of Monaco's judges are
French nationals.2 19 Prison sentences are served in French jails. The Mondgasque
criminal and civil codes closely follow the French. The Prince Regnant does enjoy
the power of pardon and amnesty, with the advice of a Crown Council 0
Monaco appears less receptive to international law than Liechtenstein or San
205. Id. at 261.
206. Id. at 262-63.
207. Du~wiIA, supra note 1, at 263.
208. Id. at 263-64.
209. Id. at 264-67.
210. Id. at 264.
211. Id. at264-65.





217. DuRsMa, supra note 1, at 266.
218. Id. at 268-70.
219. Id. at 268.
220. Id. at 268-70.
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Marino. This has produced an interesting test of the Principality's independence.
Though the Mon6gasque Supreme Tribunal recognizes the supremacy of interna-
tional conventions in principle,221 Monaco is not party to the ECHRL Unable to
proceed against Monaco under the ECHR, a party in 1993 instead made applica-
tion against France. The application theorized that because the act challenged a
judgment of one of the French judges in the Mon6gasque judiciary, that act could
be imputed to France. The ECHR held that acts of those judges are not imputable
to France.
Duursma reads this judgment to strengthen Mondgasque independence: it
makes clear, according to the author, that the French judges in Monaco do not an-
swer to France.222 I believe such a reading is strained. The plainer reading is that
decisions of French personnel in the Mondgasque judiciary are not reviewable by
the ECHRL Whether the judges are under French influence is quite a different
matter. The 1993 ECHR holding, rather than strengthening the independence of
the Principality, may in fact weaken it. France is freed of any legal liability, which
might have arisen from the power France exercises over the Mondgasque judici-
ary. The judges, French-appointed, French-recalled, and of French nationality, are
free from French influence only in the most formal sense. The fact that France
may inevitably exercise this power without any review only amplifies the weak-
ness ofjudicial independence in Monaco.
A further problem arises from the requirement that French nationals hold these
and other Mon6gasque posts: Article 25(c) of the ICCPR guarantees a person "ac-
cess, on general terms of equality, to public service in his country." A national of
Monaco cannot serve as his nation's head of government. Nor can a Mondgasque
who is not a member of the Grimaldi family ordinarily serve as head of State.
Concededly, some entities, the statehood of which nobody would deny, have con-
stitutional arrangements that withhold high offices from most citizens. In consti-
tutional monarchies, only members of the royal household become head of
State,223 and in the United Kingdom, for example, the upper legislative chamber
consists, in part, of hereditary nobles.224 This factor alone, then, is not disabling,
but given certain other problems in status, nonconformity with Article 25(c)
seems noteworthy.
More than with Liechtenstein and San Marino, foreign relations cast doubt on
Monaco's independence. If, as I argued earlier,225 the delegation of certain com-
221. Dtu-RSMA, supra note 1, at 270.
222. Id. at 272-73, 284-85 (discussing Meignan v. France, App. No. 21392/93, 75 Eur.
Comm'n H.R. Dec. & Rep. 251 (1993)).
223. Countries with monarchs as heads of State include Bahrain, Belgium, Bhutan,
Brunei, Denmark, Japan, Kuwait, Lesotho, Liechtenstein, Luxembourg, Malaysia, Mon-
aco, Morocco, the Netherlands, Norway, Oman, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, Spain, Swaziland,
Sweden, Thailand, Tonga, and the United Arab Emirates. World Heads of State and Gov-
ernment Leaders, FACTS ONFn.E WORLD NEws DIG., Sept. 30, 1993, at 736.
224. ROLAND YouNG, TBE BnrrsH PARLLAmr 57-67 (1962) (discussing the structure
of the British House of Lords).
225. See supra notes 146-61 and accompanying text (noting Liechtenstein's method of
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petences by Liechtenstein may compromise the alpine Principality's statehood,
then, a fortiori, a more extensive delegation by Monaco must compromise that
entity's statehood. Under the 1918 Treaty, Monaco even appears to have surren-
dered rights, not just delegated activities. "On its part," the Treaty reads, "the
Government of His Serene Highness the Prince of Monaco undertakes to exercise
its rights of sovereignty in perfect conformity with the political, military, naval,
and economic interests of France." 226 France, afraid of German influence in the
Grimaldi family, took preemptive steps, and some scholars have termed the result
a French protectorate over the Principality.2 27 Agreement is required vdth France
before Monaco may establish a new diplomatic mission, appoint a chief of mis-
sion, or enter into a treaty.228 Except where scientific, social, or moral problems
are under discussion, Monaco must conform its position in international confer-
ences and organizations to those of France.229 The 1918 Treaty also provides: "In
case of vacancy of the crown, especially by absence of a natural or adopted heir,
the territory will form, under the protectorate of France, an autonomous State un-
der the name 'State of Monaco."' 2 0 Duursma refers to this provision as evidence
that Monaco is not now a protectorate.231 The author, however, must concede a
problem here; the provision authorizes France under certain conditions to turn the
Principality into a protectorate. France, moreover, can create those conditions.
The 1918 Treaty accords France the power to veto a proposed regent or successor
to the throne, and no reason need be given for the veto. France can thus preserve
the vacancy which triggers France's discretion to turn Monaco into a protector-
ate. 32 Duursma is right to emphasize that neither the 1930 Convention nor the
1918 Treaty permits Mongasque denunciation2
3 3
representation abroad).
226. Dumr A, supra note 1, at 275.
227. BRmLY, supra note 94, at 136.; BATY, THm CANOes OF hnTRATiONAL LAw 8,
402-03 (1930) (terming Andorra, Monaco, and San Marino, as even "something less than
Protected States" and interpreting the 1930 Treaty between Monaco and France to "de-
prive the former Power of important attributes of sovereignty").




232. Id. at 281-82.
233. DumJPsi, supra note 1, at 285. Elsewhere, Duursma emphasizes the legal right of
particular Micro-States to denounce treaties. Id. Denunciation clauses, she argues, are
critical to the independence of the entities, so long as the assignment of functions vhich
treaties make to other countries is reversible, the assignor retains the independence to per-
form those functions. Id. Recent commentary on multi-lateral intervention has, similar to
Duursma's discussion on the treaty relations of the Micro-States, emphasized the consen-
sual and revocable nature of the pertinent arrangements. Countries may conent to a tem-
porary surrender of autonomy in the interests of domestic order or democracy. The surren-
der remains lawful, so long as consent was validly given and the treaty allowing external
intervention by the State can be denounced subject to the intervention. See David
Wippman, Treaty-Based Intervention: Wzo Can Say No?, 62 U. CH. L. REv. 607 (1995)
(advocating the use of treaties for intervention in State parties' internal humanitarian cri-
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Duursma finds support for Mondgasque statehood in international law rules,
which may undermine the agencies eroding Mondgasque independence. 234 First,
the Nuclear Tests case teaches that a treaty limiting a State's freedom of action
should be given a restrictive interpretation. 235 The 1918 and 1930 instruments,
therefore, do not work the dependency their plain language expresses. Second,
effectuating France's purported discretion to veto nominees for the throne, pre-
serve a vacancy, and create a protectorate in response would violate the self-
determination of the Mondgasque people. Self-determination, as ajus cogens rule,
is nonderogable. Thus, the instruments purporting to convey the veto discretion to
France are void.
Once again, Duursma might have done better had she moderated her formalist
approach by focusing on how the legal structures in question actually operate. In
the Monaco case study, the author has parsed through the relevant instruments
with admirable thoroughness yet has also kept a needed eye on the practical dero-
gations of Mondgasque independence. I wonder only whether the conclusion is a
little too generous.
D. ANDORRA
If Micro-States seem eccentric in the world community, then Andorra seems
eccentric even among Micro-States. The Principality of Andorra, ensconced in the
Pyrenees between France and Spain, is headed by two co-princes--the Spanish
Bishop of Urgell and the President of the French Republic-who serve as a "joint
and indivisible" head of State.236 Ancient founding charters, called the pariatges,
are at least notionally the basis for Andorra's trilateral relationship with France
and the Bishop.237 Through the Bishop, cannon law and Catholic doctrine enter
Andorran constitutive processes, 238 as must the politics of a third foreign entity,
the Holy See. Through the French co-prince, the politics and constitutive pro-
cesses of France are also felt in the Principality. Under the pariatge of 1278, the
Andorrans give biennial fief payments, called the qadstia, to their co-princes, in
person.
239
ses); see also Corten, supra note 103, at 124-25 (proposing, among four prerequisites for
an armed humanitarian intervention, that the "legitimate" authorities of the country subject
to the intervention sign an accord stating that such intervention ought to be executed).
234. DuuRSMA, supra note 1, at 307.
235. Nuclear Tests (Austl. v. Fr.), 1974 I.C.J. 253, 267 (Dec. 20), cited in DutRSMA,
supra note 1, at 308.
236. DtJuR MA, supra note 1, at 322.
237. Id. at 318; see also A.E. Dick Howard, Constitution-Making in Central and East-
em Europe, 28 SurFOLK U. L. REv. 5 (1994) (discussing the "constitutional foundation
myth"); How Ideas Travel: Rights at Home and Abroad, 63 N.Y. ST. B.J. 6 (1991) (noting
the difficulties of exporting the ideas of the American Bill of Rights to other countries in
the process of drafting their own constitutions).
238. DuunsMA, supra note 1, at 351-52.
239. Id. at 318. Others have noted the unusual character of the Andorran State. For ex-
ample, the CIA-authored WoRLD FAcrBooK, which describes the governance of virtually
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In 1993, Andorrans approved a new constitution by referendum and vote of the
legislature. The constitution of 1993 recognizes Catholic cannon law and the
French Constitution as governing the replacement of the co-princes. A General
Counsel consisting of twenty-eight counselors legislates. Draft laws can be pre-
sented to the Council by the Government, a parliamentary group, any three Coun-
sellors, any three Parish Counsels, or on the initiative of a ten percent bloc of the
electorate. Signature of the head of government and both co-princes is required to
promulgate a law. The co-princes may negotiate treaties.2 4° On two-thirds vote of
the General Council and popular referendum, the constitution may be amended. A
Constitutional Tribunal, which has advisory jurisdiction, consists of four judges,
one appointed by either co-prince and two by the General Council. The co-princes
may veto a proposed law, a treaty, or appointment of the head of government.
They jointly hold the power of pardon.
24 1
The ECHR has expressed concern over lack of independence on the part of the
Andorranjudiciary. Two deficiencies in particular have disturbed the ECHR: lack
of equality before the law and no express prohibition against discrimination. An-
dora limits the freedom of association, requires that two thirds of the capital in
an enterprise be held by Andorran nationals, prohibits non-nationals from com-
merce and industry, and bars trade unionization and collective bargaining.242 The
UN Declaration of Human Rights is in force, but in other respects Andorra is not
maximally transparent to international law.2 43
France long maintained that Andorra was not a State, but this official position
has changed. The 1993 Constitution shifted some foreign policy discretion from
the co-princes to the Head of Government. Andorra aims to secure its neutrality
and statehood, and, to the latter end, the co-princes have helped secure Andorran
representation in international organizations. The 1993 Treaty of Vicinage re-
quires Andorra to act consistently with the 'Tundamental interests" of France and
Spain. The Treaty provides no arbitration procedure, nor does it contain a denun-
ciation clause. French and Spanish missions provide diplomatic assistance to An-
dorrans in third countries, and Andorra can grant an exequatur to a third-State
ambassador only on the signatures of the co-princes.
244
every territorial entity in the world by reference to a small handful of simple types, cannot
fit Andorra into its authors' taxonomy. It refers to the Andorran system as "unique."
WORLDFAcEmOOK 1993-94 8 (1993).
240. DutJsim, supra note 1, at 321-24.
241. Id. at 325-28.
242. Id. at 326-34.
243. On the general matter of transparency to international law, see Casese, Recueil,
supra note 97, at 368-393 (positing four degrees of deference to international law in na-
tional constitutions). The phenomenon is noted in the Bosnian Constitution set up under
the 1995 Dayton Agreements. Gaeta, supra note 63, at 161. ICJ Judge Vereschchetin notes
it in many of the new constitutions of Central and Eastern Europe. Vereschchetin, supra
note 97, at 32; see also A. Bleckann, Die Volkerrechtsfreundlichkeit der Deutschen
Rechtsordnung, 23 DrE OFFEiTUHE VERwALNrG 309 (1979).
244. DuuRmm, supra note 1, at 334-39.
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Andorra confronts serious and long-established inroads against its independ-
ence. Recollecting her approach to Monaco, Duursma meticulously examines the
formal structure of Andorran law to identify limits on the external influences,
which bedevil the Micro-State's status. The French Constitution of 1958 makes
no provision for the President's role as co-prince of Andorra. Duursma infers that
there is thus no legal requirement that the French President, qua co-prince, con-
form Andorran policy to French.245 The author must concede that the absence of
law on the President's role in Andorran affairs "creates a legal insecurity with re-
gard to the personal and exclusive character of the French co-Prince's position in
Andorra." 246 If the ECHR precedent concerning the French position in Monaco
has any predictive value for Andorra, it would seem that, in a contest over an act
by the French President as co-prince, this "legal insecurity" would accentuate
French discretion over Andorran affairs. Applying the Monaco precedent, the
French chief executive would not be accountable before the ECHR for acts done
pursuant to governing Andorra. Freedom from legal responsibility increases
power.247 Duursma reiterates the point with regard to Monaco that international
law requires a conservative reading of restrictions on sovereignty. Though the
Nuclear Tests case requires this, there must come a point when such an interpre-
tive approach turns into an exercise in legal fiction. I wonder, again, whether in
the case of Andorra that point has been reached.
The Bishop of Urgell, as the other co-Prince, also poses some problems. That
he is appointed by the Church raises the complication of a third intervention in
Andorra, that of the temporal power of the Holy See. Duursma suggests that be-
cause the Papacy is to exercise no continuing authority over Bishop-qua-co-
Prince,248 there is little threat of the Holy See eroding Andorran independence.
249
I am unsure about this proposition. The power of appointment is potent and that
of promotion perhaps more so. Another problem is the requirement that the eccle-
siastic co-Prince be a Roman Catholic male. Again, such restrictions in a State
enjoying a more robust independence may be of little consequence to international
law, but inconsistencies with international provisions (ICCPR Article 25(c) in this
245. Id. at 342-43.
246. Id. at 344.
247. See supra notes 221-22 and accompanying text (analyzing Monaco's independence
from France). In fact, in the Case of Drozd and Janousek v. France and Spain, the French
and Spanish governments were held not internationally responsible by the ECHR for acts
of French and Spanish judges in the Andorran judiciary. 240 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) (1991),
cited in DuuRsMA, supra note 1, at 331-332.
248. DuuR MA, supra note 1, at 351-52 (stating that the Holy See only controls his ap-
pointment and possibility for elevation further in the Church hierarchy). See generally
ERic 0. HANSON, THE CATHOLIC CHURCH AD WoRD PoLTcs (1987) (discussing the ex-
tent to which the Pope is involved in the Bishop of Urgell's promotion and its political ef-
fect).
249. Id. In this connection, Duursma emphasizes the separation of temporal and eccle-
siastic responsibilities in the Church and its officials. Note, however, that that separation
has not always been uncontroversial. See IGNAZ S-IDL-HoHENVELDERN, CORPORATIONS IN
AND UNDER hTERNATiONAL LAW, 69 n.16 (1987).
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matter) may raise questions about Andorra.
Though membership in international organizations provides a substantial re-
inforcement for Andorran statehood, membership has carried qualifications,
which may shed doubt on that statehood. France at one time posited that Andorra
belonged to international organizations in a lesser capacity than other States. In a
communication to the Director-General of UNESCO in 1970, France, while per-
mitting Andorra's participation in international conferences, announced that
France "does not imply that this is on a footing of equality with States." France
added: "Similarly, if Andorra had been mentioned in various documents of
UNESCO alongside contracting States or among signatory States, this was an er-
ror or an inadvertence which cannot confer on that territory the status of a sover-
eign State."2 50 Although Andorra gained admission to the UN in July 1993 and
the Council of Europe in November 1994, neither body held extensive discussions
on whether Andorra possessed the qualities of an independent state.
E. VATICAN CITY
The State of the Vatican City, seat of the Holy See, comprises the smallest en-
tity to claim statehood. 25 1 Covering less than half a square kilometer and claim-
ing only 165 resident nationals (431 nationals in total), the Vatican State traces
its origins to AD 395 when Emperor Constantine extended recognition to the
Christian Church. The territorial power of the Papacy witnessed many vicissi-
tudes. Napoleon invaded and annexed the Papal States in 1807 and 1809. Inde-
pendent again after 1815, the Vatican State came under pressure in the 1850s,
when Italian nationalists began unifying the peninsula. The nationalists faced,
however, a French military contingent that defended the Pope's territorial domain
from 1850 until the end of the French Second Empire in 1870. In 1871, Italy an-
nexed the Papal States, by then the last substantial Italian territory not consoli-
dated into the new Kingdom of Italy. The nationalists offered the Pope a guaran-
tee of pontifical control over the Vatican, but he rejected it. The "Roman
Question" remained a complication in Italian politics for over a half a century.252
The Lateran Agreements, concluded between Italy and the Holy See in Febru-
ary 1929, established the State of the Vatican City and gave the State its present
territory.2 53
All legislative, executive, and judicial powers under Vatican law reside in the
Sovereign Pontiff. The Sacred College of Cardinals holds power during vacancies
of the Papacy, but its legislative acts lapse upon selection of a new Pope. The Pope
250. See DuumM, supra note 1, at 356 (quoting Communication of French Minister of
Foreign Affairs to Director-General UNESCO, December 8, 1970).
251. But see Samuel Pyeatt Menefee, Nation-Building on the Continental Shlf and in
the World's Oceans, 25 CAL. W. &tr'L L.J. 81 (1994) (documenting a litany of eccentrics
who purported to set up States on oil platforms, coral atolls, sand bars, and the like).
252. DuumiA, supra note 1, at 374-76.
253. Id. at 376.
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delegates certain powers to a Pontifical Commission. Four law courts sit in the
Vatican, and their judges need not be Vatican citizens. The sources of law are
canon law, the Sovereign Pontiff, and delegates of the Sovereign Pontiff. Divine
and natural law provide guidance to fill gaps in the other sources, and the Italian
Code of Civil Procedure applies where it is consistent with the Lateran Agree-
ments, canon law, and divine law. Unspecified acts not punishable under any ap-
plicable penal law may result in up to six months detention. Such acts fall under
the broad categories of violations of the principles of religion, civil order, and
public safety.
254
Although the Vatican is a Contracting Party to the Convention Relating to
Status of Refugees of 1951 and the Convention on the Rights of the Child, human
rights ombudsmen note deficiencies in the State's implementation of certain in-
ternational norms. In particular, the possibility of punishment for unenumerated
offenses draws criticism.255 The requirement that all Vatican employees profess
the Catholic faith and eschew organizations deemed anti-Catholic also proves
problematic. Foreigners in the Vatican do not enjoy the same ready access to resi-
dency permits as nationals, and Vatican law contains no guarantee of freedom of
expression or assembly.256 Vatican citizenship derives from official functions in
the Church. Cardinals are Vatican nationals, and, under unusual terms of the Lat-
eran Treaty, the revocation of Vatican citizenship results in automatic Italian citi-
zenship. In evaluating these problems, however, it is important to bear in mind
that the Vatican has the unique purpose of physically accommodating the Holy
See.257 Arguably the special international religious mission of the Holy See ne-
cessitates a restrictive legal regime within that entity's territorial host.
The international role of the Holy See largely determines the international re-
lations of the Vatican. The Holy See governs the Vatican's foreign policy. The
international policy of the Church centers on maintaining its own neutrality,
while engaging actively in Christian diplomacy. The Holy See also cultivates re-
lations between individual States and the Church 258 through diplomatic missions
in the name of the Holy See.
The Vatican retains numerous ties to Italy despite its claim as an independent
state. The Vatican maintains a postal union with Italy and follows Italian postal
regulation.259 A similar relationship controls telephone and telegraph matters.
260
254. Id. at 377-81.
255. See, e.g., Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Free-
doas, Nov. 4, 1950, art. 7, para. 1, 213 U.N.T.S. 221 (stating that "[n]o one shall be held
guilty of any criminal offense on account of any act or omission which did not constitute a
criminal offense, under national or international law, at the time it was committed"); Inter-
national Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, Dec. 16, 1966, art. 15, para. 1, 999
U.N.T.S. 171 (restating the same language).
256. DuuRsMA, supra note 1, at 383-85.
257. Id. at 383.
258. Id. at 386-89. The earliest of these pontifical nunciatures dates from 1500. Id.




Monetary union also links Italy and the Vatican.26 1 The Vatican remains exempt
from Italian customs and has no value-added tax (VAT). A Merchandise Office
grants permission to bring goods into the Vatican. To prevent use of Vatican
customs-free status to dodge the Italian tariff regime, export of goods from the
Vatican is prohibited. Italo-Vatican relations changed in 1984 when a Concordat
between the two States affirmed the separation of church and State by eliminating
the Catholic Church as the official Italian State church.
2 62
The foreign policy of the Holy See remains unusual because it has little to do
with the worldly aspects of the Vatican. Although the Vatican does belong to the
1954 Hague Convention for the Protection of Cultural Property in the Event of
Armed Conflict with every building in the Vatican City registered thereunder,
Holy See foreign relations generally, however, are not concerned with the Vatican
territory. Characteristic of Holy See diplomatic activities are mediations, such as
those in 1885 between Germany and Spain over the Caroline Islands and 1979
between Argentina and Chile over the Beagle Channel.263 The Holy See (not the
Vatican) has Permanent Observer status at the UN and belongs to several UN spe-
cialized organizations, including the ITU, UPU, and the International Wheat
Council. The Holy See also occupies a permanent observer post at the Organiza-
tion of American States. The OSCE, since the 1991 Madrid Conference, receives
two representatives from the Holy See as "guests of honor." Though the Holy See
voices moral support for the Council of Europe without indicating an interest in
membership, Duursma speculates that some human rights issues surrounding the
Vatican pose obstacles to Council membership. Unlike the other four Micro-States
in Duursma's study, the Vatican remains unbound by the EU customs regime.
There has been an Apostolic nuncio to the EC/EU since 1970.264
The lack of a permanent population in the Vatican seems to defeat a claim to
statehood under the traditional criteria. As outlined below, Duursma accounts for
the near-universal acceptance of the Vatican as a State by reference to a constitu-
tive recognition.2 65 The subordinate status of the Vatican to the Holy See raises
interesting questions of Vatican independence even though the Holy See lacks ter-
ritorial entity status ordinarily contemplated when evaluating State independence.
Inquiry into whether Japan exercised de facto control over the putative State of
Manchukuo (1933-45),266 or Germany over the Independent State of Croatia
(1941-44),267 or South Africa over the Bantustans (1976-1993)26 8 focuses on in-
261. DuumSMA, supra note 1, at 391-92.
262. Id. at 395.
263. Id. at 396-97.
264. Id. at 401-10.
265. See infra note 286 and accompanying text (recognizing the Vatican's constitutive
effect).
266. See supra note 88 (discussing the state of Manchukuo).
267. See Socony Vacumn Oil Company Claim, 21 I.L.R. 55 (U.S. 1954) (rejecting an
International Claims Settlement Act petition by an American corporation seeking compen-
sation from post-World War If Yugoslavia for losses suffered under the independent State
of Croatia).
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tervention by a State. The Holy See, though an international person, is not a State.
If the Holy See can effect a material erosion of the independence of the Vatican,
the question arises whether entities other than States can generally effect such
erosion. Practice suggests that it has been States alone which could erode a State's
independence, but the case of the Holy See and Vatican State may show other-
wise. In a world of non-governmental international organizations multiplying in
importance and number, the possibility deserves further reflection.
269
268. See Republic of Transkei Constitution Act, July 9, 1976, 15 I.LM. 1136 (entered
into force Oct. 26, 1976) (creating, within South Africa, the nominally self-governing
homelands of Bophuthatswana, Venda, Ciskei, and Transkei). The Republic of Transkei
Constitution Act also provided for "non-independent" homelands. These were Gazankulu,
KaNgwane, KwaNdebele, KwaZulu, Lebow, and QwaQwa. See also John Dugard, South
Africa's 'Independent' Homelands: An Exercise in Denationalization, 10 J. IrT'L L. POL'Y
11 (1980) (discussing the international legal status of the South African homelands); Johan
D. van der Vyver, Statehood in International Law, 5 EMORY INT'L L. Rtv. 9 (1991) (de-
tailing various statehood recognition methods).
269. See SE]DL-HoHENVELDERN, supra note 249, at 4. Seidl-Hohenveldern offers an in-
triguing analysis in this direction. Extrapolating from State practice acknowledging the
international legal personality of the United Nations and other international organizations,
one might postulate an international business organization achieving "complete... disen-
tanglement from all municipal legal systems."Id. Seidl-Hohenveldern further suggests
registration for business enterprises created under international law, scrutinized by UN
regulatory agents, and enjoying "diplomatic protection" granted by the UN. Id. at 23.
Seidl-Hohenveldern traces the idea to Goldman, Les Entreprises Multinationales, I Ann.
Inst. Droit Int'l 57 (1977), but acknowledges that the Institut de Droit International "quite
simply balked at the idea that there could exist a corporation not subject to the national
law of any State." Id. at 25-26. If such a postulated entity came into being, however, the
Holy See would present a close analogue to it, and the possibility that that entity could ef-
fect erosions of State independence would have to be admitted. If multi-national corpora-
tions became, 6 la Seidl-Hohenveldern, possessors of international legal personality (and
assuming from the Holy See-Vatican example that non-State international persons may
erode the legal independence of States), then a great many States would suffer abridge-
ment of their legal independence. This would demand a reconceptualization either of rec-
ognition or of statehood. States in which multinational corporations exercised controlling
influence would retain statehood only if the recognition of those States was of a constitu-
tive or 'reparative' nature or independence was no longer an element of statehood. Con-
stitutive recognition is now generally assumed to be exceptional; under the former, it
would be commonplace. Independence is now viewed as critical to statehood; under the
latter, it would be dispensable. See also Texaco Overseas Petroleum Co. v. The Libyan
Arab Republic, 53 INT'L. L. Rm'. 389 (1977) (holding that a contract between an oil com-
pany and a State was a contract under international law and that the corporate party had
capacity under international law).
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H1. LESSONS FROM THE MICRO-STATES AND
SOME NEW QUESTIONS
From the experience of the Micro-States, Duursma has drawn a number of
conclusions about self-determination, statehood, and recognition. I have summa-
rized the author's exposition in the preceding sections and offered some com-
mentary and criticism. The first section below places Duursma's description of
recognition in the framework of contemporary discourse. Then, in the two sec-
tions following, I will briefly discuss further lines of inquiry suggested by this
book.
A. THE EFFECTS OF RECOGNITION
The economy of legal thought permits a certain amount of fiction. But if a
proposition relies on a whole series of attenuated arguments, the limits of that
economy may be exceeded. Through the five case studies, Duursma demands
stretches of legal imagination to sustain the proposition that her subjects are
States in the full sense of the term. In addition, the author dismisses a variety of
factors as political and/or extra-legal, and thus not material to the juridical posi-
tion of the Micro-States. This is a conceptual flaw. The condition of the Micro-
States requires a less sanguine evaluation than Duursma's. These entities face se-
rious diminutions in their capacity for free action, especially in international af-
fairs, and in their domestic realm as well. Duursma's formalist approach tends,
with its emphasis of rights on paper, to obscure real disabilities.
A skeptical view of the Micro-States must nevertheless concede to these enti-
ties great strides in international status. Micro-State membership in international
organizations throughout the 1990's provides the greatest evidence of these
strides. Although States have essentially enjoyed a monopoly on such member-
ship, Micro-States, with their observed deficiencies in statehood criteria, currently
are well-represented in the UN and other international organizations. It is to this
puzzling fact that Duursma applies a more satisfying, if still provocative, concep-
tual approach.
The most convincing evidence which Duursma provides of the Micro-States'
statehood is their admission into international organizations and the statements
which in many instances of such admission confirmed the entities' legal status as
States. The Security Council Committee of Experts, for example, noted in 1949
that Liechtenstein "possessed all the qualifications of a State." 270 During the run-
up to San Marino's admission to the Council of Europe in 1988, Council rappor-
teurs expressed the view that "relations between Italy and San Marino are not
such as to detract from the latter's sovereignty" and that "it is vital to note that the
sovereignty and independence of San Marino also derive from recognition of the
country by the international community." 271 The UNESCO Executive Board con-
270. DuumiA, supra note 1, at 175.
271. Id. at 243 (quoting Parliamentary Assembly, Documents: Working Papers, Council
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cluded in the late 1940s that Monaco is "essentially a small independent State,"
and Duursma treats this as support for Mondgasque statehood.272 Further support
for recognition of Monaco took the form of UN permanent observer status and,
after May 1993, membership.273 Andorra provides additional evidence. In ac-
cepting Andorra as a participant in certain EEC negotiations, the European
Commission in 1988 affirmed that "Andorra is an independent State."
274
This evidence raises two questions. First, does an international organization
possess the discretion to execute through its admissions procedures acts of State
recognition legally binding outside the organization? Secondly, can any act of
recognition bestow attributes of statehood missing on objective evaluation of the
entity claiming statehood? Dugard addressed this first question at length in the
late 1980s.275 Though Dugard attributed a substantial normative force to such
admissions, it remains doubtful whether even the UN has, under international
law, developed into an organ of collective recognition.276 Admission clarifies the
admitting organization's view of the Micro-State's status, but admission may have
less meaning among States (even member States) and other organizations. It does
not have binding effect as regards recognition by others. Duursma places a great
deal of weight on the admissions of Micro-States to international organizations,
yet such events may be less probative of statehood than Duursma implies.
If one accepts Duursma's attribution of broad recognition effect to the admis-
sions, then there still remains the question of the nature of recognition-the old
debate that pitted "declaratists" against "constitutivists. ' 277 Duursma refers at a
number of points to constitutive or "reparative" acts of recognition. Such recogni-
tion precedes the attainment by its object of some or all attributes of statehood.
Notwithstanding deficiency of statehood criteria, the object, in the view Duursma
of Europe, Doc. No. 5938, at 6, 15-17 (1988)).
272. Id. at 295-96.
273. Id. at 303-04.
274. Id. at 361 (quoting Session Documents, Eur. Pan., Doc. No. A3-0256/90 at 5, 12
(1990)).
275. See generally DUGARD, supra note 7 (discussing membership in an intenational
organization and its effect on statehood).
276. Hersch Lauterpacht in 1947 proposed such a role for the United Nations. See
H sERscH LAUTERPACHT, RECOGNITION IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 78 (1948) (proposing that the
Untied Nations adopt substantial normative recognition of states).
277. Declaratory doctrine held that recognition simply acknowledges that a set of con-
ditions equivalent to statehood obtains within a particular community, constitutivism, by
contrast, held that recognition is an essential attribute of statehood and thus recognition at
least in part constitutes the State. What James Crawford called the "Great Debate" has
been summarized numerously. See, e.g., IAN BROWNLm, PRINCPLES OF PUBLIC
INTERNATiONAL LAW 74-81 (3d. ed. 1979); CRAWFoPD, supra note 7, at 16-23; DuoARD,
supra note 7, at 7-9; LAUTERPACET, supra note 277, at 38-66; 1 DANmL P. O'CONNELL,
INTERNATIONAL LAW 132-34 (10th ed. 1989); Nkambo Mugerwa, Subjects of International
Law (describing the doctrinal controversy concerning the nature of recognition in interna-




seems to adopt, becomes a state by and through recognition. In the least, Duursma
proposes that recognition can make up for a certain shortfall in sovereign charac-
ter: "From the Micro-States' point of view, the United Nations not only offers a
recognition of their sovereign equality, but also enhances that sovereignty by pro-
viding more judicial and certainly more political protection against external in-
terference in their internal affairs.- 2 78
Recognition, "a subject full of paradoxes and curiosities," 279 presents a new
source of puzzlement in its scholars' continuing reference to the categories of an
apparently exhausted debate. Contemporary analysis (though not in all in-
stances)280 tends to pay tribute to the debate without detaining itself over doc-
trinal preferences.281 The prevalence of opinion in favor of declaratory doctrine is
amply noted.28 Although the two doctrines today occasion little debate and it is
agreed that one of the two old rivals is the "better view," scholars and jurists con-
tinue to use both the terms "declaratory" and "constitutive." Hersch Lauterpacht,
perhaps foreshadowing the eclipse of the old debate, proposed in 1947 that recog-
nition constitutes some rights but merely declares the existence of others:
Although recognition is... declaratory of an existing fact [the pre-sence of the
conditions of statehood], such declaration... is constitutive, as between the rec-
ognizing State and the community so recognized, of international rights and du-
ties associated with full statehood. Prior to recognition such rights and obliga-
tions exist only to the extent to which they have been expressly conceded or
legitimately asserted, by reference to compelling rules of humanity and justice,
either by the existing members of international society or by the people claiming
recognition.
2 83
Presumably, the right against external aggression, if asserted by an unrecog-
nized community, falls under Lauterpacht's category of rights independent of rec-
ognition. On the other hand, rights of a more active nature are perhaps more de-
pendent on recognition. This formulation and variants of it have recurred in
discussions of recognition. The effects of recognition are noted to be pronounced
where the community recognized does not enjoy firm footing in international so-
ciety. "[S]uch recognition may well be constitutive of legal obligation for the rec-
ognizing or acquiescing State, but it may also tend to consolidate a general legal
status at that time precarious or in statu nascendi. Recognition, while in principle
declaratory, may thus be of great importance in particular cases."
284
278. DuuRSA, supra note 1, at 142 (emphasis added).
279. See J.G. STARE, STuDrs ih'II TnO,,NT AL LAW (1965).
280. See, e.g., McDouGAL ET AL., PUBLIC ORDER 301-431 (1981) (emphasizing issues
such as putative duties of recognition and nonrecognition and the collective or unilateral
nature of recognition; but not addressing directly the classic declaratory-constitutive de-
bate).
281. SeeDuuMA , supra note 1, at 110-11 n.10.
282. DuURsMA, supra note 1, at 111.
283. LAUTERPAC-T, supra note 276, at 6.
284. See CRAwFORD, supra note 7, at 74. Shaw echoes this proposition. See SeAw, su-
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Duursma's approach is most similar to this last characterization because Duur-
sma treats recognition as possessing a reparative force over "incomplete" States.
This approach to recognition represents a trend in contemporary writing. The
terms of the old debate-constitutive and declaratory-have been retained, though
scholars are now less interested in the nature of recognition as a concept. Rather,
contemporary writers apply the terms to describe specific instances of recognition.
Although acknowledging the declaratory nature of recognition generally, Duur-
sma notes that recognition "can have constitutive effect in certain cases," such as
those in which entities recognized as States lack the basic criteria for state-
hood.285 The Vatican City, though recognized as a State in international law,
lacks a permanent population. Duursma posits that recognition of the Vatican
City had a constitutive effect. 286 Its lack of actual independence from France ren-
ders Monaco, under Crawford's criteria, a non-State, yet it, too, is recognized.
Duursma calls the recognition of Monaco constitutive. Simultaneously, she pro-
poses that at some future time, after Monaco secures independence in practice, the
"constitutive effect [of the recognition of Monaco] will turn fully declaratory." 287
Liechtenstein, a more fully-formed State, by contrast did not receive or require
constitutive recognition: "Liechtenstein's recognition was not meant to be repara-
tive of a lack of independence." 28 8 Similar to the Alpine Principality, though ac-
cording to Duursma somewhat less secure in its independence than Liechtenstein,
San Marino needed no "reparative constitutive recognition." 289 Recognition of
Andorra, by contrast, seemed aimed at compensating for "the non-fulfillment of
all criteria for statehood." 290 Finally, the Vatican exhibits the most pronounced
deficiencies, lacking at least two essential statehood attributes. Yet, through rec-
ognition, the Vatican is viewed as a State, or as Duursma posits, "any interna-
tional recognition of the Vatican City's statehood would have a constitutive and
reparative effect." 291
pra note 70, at 246.
285. See DuuRSMA, supra note 1, at 115.
286. Id. at419.
287. Id. at 315.
288. Id. Alternatively, Liechtenstein's recognition was "purely declaratory." Id. at 202.
289. DUuRSMA, supra note 1, at 259.
290. Id. at 371. Duursma goes on to explain that Andorra was so deficient in independ-
ence that recognition alone could not constitute it a full-fledged State. The Trilateral
Treaty of Vicinage of 1993, diminishing the role of the French and ecclesiastic co-princes
in Andorran affairs, enhanced Andorran independence and thus established Andorra's
statehood in international law. The creation of statehood by treaty and external guarantee
is another topic. See, e.g., Wippnaan, supra note 233, at 608, 633-640 (proposing that
state-making-by-treaty occurred in Bosnia-Herzegovina and Cyprus, among other States);
see also Thomas Ehrlich, Cyprus, the 'Warlike Isle:' Origins and Elements of the Current
Crisis 18 SrAN. L. Rav. 1021 (1965-66) (discussing the formation of Cyprus).
291. Dt.UsMA, supra note 1, at 412-14 (finding that the Vatican lacks a permanent
population and independence since persons hold Vatican nationality only while serving the




Today, the two classic doctrines of recognition are no longer self-contained
theories. Nor are they mutually exclusive. Instead, the declaratory and constitutive
doctrines are lenses that assist observers in focusing their analysis of particular
incidents of recognition. They are used in tandem to describe different aspects of
recognition and to describe the distinguishing features, not so much of the insti-
tution of State recognition generally, as of particular incidents of recognition. Two
conceptions that once separated opposing schools in a "great debate" over the na-
ture of recognition have retained their vitality as a means to characterize individ-
ual events. Thus, Varbrick 292 and Kred5a (the Judge ad hoc in the recent Geno-
cide opinion)2 9 3 refer to the recognition of Bosnia-Herzegovina as "constitutie."
The publicist and the jurist do not cite the recognition of Bosnia-Herzegovina as
evidence of the "constitutive nature" of recognition; instead they use the expres-
sion "constitutive recognition" to describe that discrete event Another illustration
of the terms of the old debate in their contemporary usage is found in an analysis
of the peace process in Cambodia: "[W]hereas the recognition of states and gov-
ernments is best regarded as declaratory only, the recognition of the SNC was
Clearly onstitutive." 294 The term "constitutive" here describes recognition of a
new governmental structure in Cambodia, not the nature of a general form of in-
ternational legal action. Judge ad hoc Kreda's usage, and possibly Warbrick's as
well, invests in the term "constitutive" a connotation of censure. This, too, was
not seen in the traditional usage. Publicists may have criticized the constitutive
conception of recognition,2 95 but in the main, they did not use the term to censure
particular instances of State conduct.2 96 Unlike Kreda or Warbrick, Duursma does
not add a connotation of censure to "constitutive." In positing that "a State can
also be established by means of a constitutive recognition with reparative ef-
fect,"2 9 7 Duursa seems, in fact, to narrow the circumstances in which recogni-
tion may be considered a delict.
292. Warbrick identifies in EU practice regarding Bosnia-Herzegovina a reliance on
recognition as some kind of constitutive device. Colin Warbrick, Recognition of States, 41
INT'L & Comp'. L. Q. 473 (1993).
293. See Application of the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime
of Genocide (Bosn. & Herz. v. Yugo.), 1996 LC.. 1, 25 (Jul. 11) (Kreda, J., dissenting)
(characterizing Western Europe's recognition of Bosnia-Herzegovina as an "instrument" to
establish conditions suitable for a peace agreement) [hereinafter Genocide].
294. Steven R Ratner, The Cambodia SettlementAgreements, 87 A. . IT'LL. 1, 11
(1993).
295. See, e.g., CHEN TI-CHAmam, THE InTSNATON, AL LAW, OF REC=aTmo,, wriTa
SPECIAL RE NCE TO PRACTCE iN GREAT BRiTAIN AND HaUN-ED STATES 46 (1951).
296. See, e.g., LASSA OPPEMIm , In TIONAL LAw 128-29 (Robert Jennings and
Arthur Watts eds., 1992). Recognition extended before the attainment of the attributes of
statehood is sometimes seen as premature or precipitous. Id.
297. DUURSmA, supra note 1, at 418. The author posits this even more strongly later
noting that "international recognition of a Micro-State can remedy any non-fulilment of
criteria for statehood." Id. at 430. Does Duursma mean that widespread recognition of an
entity lacking even a territory could create that entity an international person? Judging by
the author's analysis of the Holy See, the answer would seem to be yes.
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The repeated attention Duursma accords to the difference between constitutive
and declaratory acts of recognition may give the appearance of re-opening the
recognition debate. To the extent the author takes up the issue of recognition
doctrine, she may sound rather old-fashioned. Yet, in identifying certain instances
of the recognition of Micro-States as constitutive of statehood and others as de-
claratory, Duursma participates in a current trend.
B. FACT-FINDING AND PEOPLEHOOD
Duursma repeatedly emphasizes that self-determination is a right enjoyed by a
people or fraction of a people bearing an attachment to a specific territory. Posses-
sion of that right is critical to a population if that population is successfully to al-
lege statehood. Though Duursma develops definitions of self-determination and
peoplehood at great length, she offers little analysis of the claims of the inhabi-
tants of the Micro-States to constitute peoples. This may, of course, be of neces-
sity: the author has produced an exhaustive book. Limitations on the scope of the
book may well have precluded investigation of what, within Duursma's frame-
work, is essentially a factual question. Nonetheless, I suspect that the author's
presumption that the Micro-State populations form peoples deserves more exami-
nation. Consider Duursma's discussion of the Mondgasque:
Monaco has been a separate territory at least since the sixteenth century, though
receiving military protection from other States. Moreover, since its admission to
the United Nations, there can be no doubt that Monaco is a State entitled to the
legal protection flowing from the principle of self-determination. If therefore
Monaco were to have a people within the meaning of the right of self-
determination, it would have ajus cogens right of self-determination. The 5,070
Mondgasque nationals distinguish themselves from their neighboring people on
historical, traditional, cultural and to a certain extent on linguistic grounds.
There exists a distinct Mondgasque language, which is not the official language
of the State and is no longer spoken by all Mondgasque nationals. The objective
characteristics of the Mondgasque nation have been formed by ages of together-
ness, relative autonomy and an attachment to the traditional organization and
reign of the Grimaldi family. The subjective element is present in the we-
consciousness of the Mondgasque nationals who want to be considered a people
desirous to live in a separate State. The core of the Mongasque people is coin-
posed of the descendants of families who have lived in the Mondgasque territory
for centuries, some since the Grimaldi family took possession of Monaco. The
objective characteristics, though not striking, are noticeable and strengthened by
a traditional attachment to the territory and the monarchy. Therefore, the
Mondgasque people has ajus cogens right of self-determination without preju-
dice to whether it constitutes one people or fraction of a people.
298
This is the extent of Duursma's analysis of the objective and subjective ele-
298. DUuRSMA, supra note 1, at 310-11; see also, id. at 204-05 (discussing Liechten-




ments of Mon6gasque peoplehood. Its brevity would not stand out, but for the ex-
haustiveness of Duursma's methodology elsewhere. Here, the conclusive tone is
incongruent with the encyclopedic support marshaled behind most other proposi-
tions advanced in the book. Peoplehood occupies an important position in Duur-
sma's proposed law of statehood. Yet, whether the inhabitants of the Micro-States
form peoples receives only cursory attention. The flaw is probably unavoidable,
given the limits of scope which constrain any author. Indeed, the feature may not
even represent a flaw, but rather an invitation to a separate work on the people-
hood of Micro-State populations. Such a work, perhaps combining sociology, an-
thropology, political theory, and history would provide a useful companion to the
present book.
299
C. JUDGES AND INDEPENDENCE
External contribution to the judicial structures of nascent States is a topic of
some current interest. Trevor Findlay, examining the United Nations Transitional
Authority in Cambodia (UNTAC), 30 0 describes various impediments to achieving
a stable municipal order in Cambodia. Among these, he emphasizes the lack of a
functioning legal system.30 1 Findlay proposes that future UN interventions like
that in Cambodia would meet their goals more readily if they included what
Findlay terms "judicial packages."30 2 By "judicial packages," Findlay means
placing foreign prosecutors, defense counsel, judges, and prison administrators in
office in the country subject to UN intervention-in short, "importing" whole
cloth an independent judicial system.30 3 Although attractive for its potential to
hasten the return of tranquility to troubled lands, the "judicial package" raises
concerns over independence.
30 4
All five Micro-States in Duursma's study contain foreign elements in their ju-
diciaries. In the case of Liechtenstein, three of eight Sole Judges are Austrian and
prison sentences over six months are served in a Swiss cantonal prison.30 5 The
San Marinese judiciary, by law, consists of non-nationals. Only a special "Con-
ciliatory Judge" may be a citizen of the Republic or a judge approved by near-
unanimous vote of the Great and General Council. In practice, San Marinese
299. The difficulty in assessing whether in a particular case a "people" e.csts has been
noted elsewhere. See, e.g., SusAN L. WooDwARD, BALKAN TRAGEDY: CHAO3 AND
DlSSOLUrIoNAFmmTHm CoLr WAR 163 (1995).
300. TREvoRFnDLAY, CxmoDIA: TmE LErACY AND LESSONS OFUNTAC 238 (1995).
301. Id.
302. See Jamie Fredric Metzl, Book Reviev: The Legacy and Lessons of UIAAC, 37
HAnv. IhT'LL.J. 293, 302 (1996) (discussing Findlay's proposal).
303. Id.
304. See id. at 293, 302. Metzl, Who is critical of Findlay writes: "Mhile this approach
is appealing, it poses a danger of crossing the invisible line distinguishing United Nations
peacemaking missions from multilateral colonialism." Id.
305. See DuusniA, supra note 1, at 154-55 (describing the judicial sytem of Liechten-
stein).
1997]
AM. U J. INT'L L. & POL'Y
judges come from Italy.30 6 Under the Convention of July 1930, a majority of
judges in the Mondgasque judiciary must be French nationals belonging to the ju-
dicial administration of France.30 7 The French and ecclesiastic co-princes of An-
dorra appoint members of the Principality's Constitutional Tribunal and Supreme
Council of Justice. 30 8 Judges in the courts of the Vatican need not be Vatican na-
tionals.
309
In order to reduce internal disorder, the Cypriot Constitution of 1960 required
foreign judges in the Cypriot courts. The Supreme Constitutional Court was com-
posed of one judge from the Greek community, one from the Turkish community,
and a third from a country other than Greece, Turkey, Britain, and Cyprus (the
first three countries were the Guaranteeing Powers who created the Cypriot State
under the 1960 Treaty of Guarantee). 3 10 The third, to act as a neutral, also was
President of the Court.3 11 A High Court of Justice, holding appellate jurisdiction
over matters not under the jurisdiction of the Supreme Constitutional Court, was
composed of two judges from the Greek community, one from the Turkish com-
munity, and a fourth neutral judge from outside Cyprus or the Guaranteeing Pow-
ers who would cast two votes.
3 12
The judiciary of the new Bosnian State contains provisions for foreign in-
volvement in the judiciary as wel. 3 13 A General Framework Agreement for Peace
in Bosnia and Herzegovina was negotiated in Dayton, Ohio on November 21,
306. See id. at 214-17 (elaborating on the structure of the San Marinese judiciary).
307. Id. at 268.
308. Id. at 26.
309. Id. at 379.
310. See UK Command Papers, Draft Treaty of Guarantee between the United King-
dom, Greece, Turkey and the Republic of Cyprus, Cmnd 1093, Part II, Appendix B, at 86
(July 1960) (on file with AM. U.J. INTL L. & PoL'Y).
311. Id. at 91 (containing the draft Constitution of the Republic of Cyprus). Cypriots
ratified their Constitution at Nicosia on April 6, 1960. Id. at 3. Articles 133 through 151
provide for the Supreme Constitutional Court. Article 133(1) and (3) provide for the for-
eign judge. The Supreme Constitutional Court had jurisdiction over conflicts among the
organs of Cypriot government, election contests, and various other political and constitu-
tional matters, as well as an advisory jurisdiction over questions put to it by the President
or Vice President of the Republic.
312. Cyprus Const., arts. 152-64. Article 153(1) and (3) provide for the foreign judge.
Id. arts. 153(1), (3); see Ehrlich, supra note 290, at 1033-39; Catherine D. Papastatho-
poulos, Constitutionalism and Communalism: the Case of Cyprus, 16 U. ToRoNro L.J.
118 (1965-66) (discussing the roles of communalism, conflict, and compromise in the birth
of constitutive documents for Cyprus). From September 1960 until he resigned in the wake
of a case concerning the organization of Cypriot municipalities in April 1963, Ernest
Forsthoff, a constitutional and administrative law scholar from Heidelberg, sat as President
of the Supreme Constitutional Court. See Ehrlich, supra note 290, at 1040-43. The consti-
tutional order fell apart in December 1963. Id.
313. See General Framework Agreement for Peace in Bosnia and Herzegovina, Dec. 14,




1995 and signed on December 14 of that year in Paris. 314 Like the Treaty of
Guarantee of 1960, the Framework Agreement committed the relevant parties,
plus external guarantors, to support a constitutional framework in the country in
question. 3 15 Annex 4 to the General Framework Agreement contains the Consti-
tution of Bosnia and Herzegovina.3 16 Article VI of the Bosnian Constitution pro-
vides for a Constitutional Court. 317 The Court's jurisdiction is exclusive over dis-
putes between the constituent ethnic-territorial entities of the Republic and
between governmental organs.318 The Court also has appellate jurisdiction over
constitutional issues arising out ofjudgments of lower Bosnian courts. 19 Making
explicit the transparency of the Bosnian legal system to international law, Article
VI 3(c) gives the Constitutional Court jurisdiction to decide the compatibility of
Bosnian laws with the European Convention for Human Rights and Fundamental
Freedoms and to decide issues concerning "the existence or the scope of a general
rule of public international law pertinent to [a lower court's] decision." 320 Nine
judges compose the Constitutional Court, three of whom are selected by the Presi-
dent of the European Court of Human Rights (in consultation with the Bosnian
Presidency) and may not be citizens of the Republic or any of its neighboring
States.321 Annex 6 to the General Framework Agreement makes special provision
for human rights, and it provides for a Commission on Human Rights outside the
judicial structure set up under the Constitution.322 The Commission consists of
two organs, an Office of the Ombudsman and a Human Rights Chamber.323 The
Ombudsman is appointed by the Chairman of the Organization for Security and
Cooperation in Europe, on consultation with the parties to the Dayton-Paris
Agreement, and may not be a citizen of Bosnia and Herzegovina or any neigh-
boring State, for at least the first five years of the Office of the Ombudsman's op-
emtionL324 The Human Rights Chamber consists of fourteen members, eight of
whom are appointed, at least for an initial five-year term, by the Committee of
Ministers of the Council of Europe and may not be a citizen of the Republic or
314. Id.
315. See Sienho Yee, The New Constitution ofBosnia and Herzegovina, 7 Eum. J hrr'L
L. 176, 181 (1996) (noting "nation-building aspirations" in the new constitution). Simi-
larities between the Dayton Agreements and the Camp David Agreements of September
1978 have been noted, though not discussed. See Gaeta, supra note 63, at 147; see also
GFA, supra note 313, art. I (noting that the external guarantors in the Dayton-Paris
Framework Agreement are Croatia, the EU, France, Germany, Russia, the United King-
dom, the United States, and Yugoslavia).
316. See Yee, supra note 315, at 176.
317. Bosnia & Herzgovina Const., art. VL
318. Id. art. VI (3)(a).
319. Id. art. VI(3)(b).
320. Id. art. VI (3)(c).
321. Id. art. VI (a)- (b).
322. See GFA, supra note 313, art. II (referencing Annex 6 on Human Rights).
323. Id.
324. Id. arts. IV-VI (noting that the Ombudsman has a broad investigatory role over
matters concerning human rights).
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any of its neighbors.3 25 In the recent International Court of Justice judgment in
the Genocide case,3 26 the Yugoslav judge ad hoc issued a dissenting opinion in
which he questioned the statehood of Bosnia.327 In positing that the Republic dis-
played "a strongly installed element of an international protectorate," Judge ad
hoc Kreda pointed out the provisions for foreign presence on the Constitutional
Com-L328
To my knowledge, no study has addressed principally the matter of foreign
judges in a municipal court system. Scholars have inquired into the "trmspar-
ency" of domestic legal systems to international law,329 but the phenomenon of
foreign judges seems either distinct from that subject or a discrete subpart of it.
Foreign judges may be more suited than local judges to apply international law in
a municipal context-particularly rules set forth in human rights conventions-
but at least in Liechtenstein, San Marino, and Monaco, foreign judges preside
over contests between local parties, address municipal legal issues, and often
resolve cases within the framework of municipal rules. Duursma's case studies
illustrate that foreign elements are a characteristic feature of Micro-State
judiciaries. This may be a product of the personnel and financial limitations
which confront Micro-States in many departments. 33 0 Duursma notes that at least
one of the Micro-States has been hard-pressed to keep up with the paper work
generated by membership in international organizations. 33 1 Even if the reliance
on foreign judges is in part a product of that same pressure, it produces distinct
results. The observed receptiveness of the Micro-States to international law and to
the law of their neighboring States may stem in part from the presence of non-
national judicial personnel. This unusual aspect of the Micro-States' judicial
structures may be important in reducing the potential disordering effects of
international fragmentation: if small entities require (or, in practice, nearly
always employ) non-nationals on the bench, the entities may be more likely to
325. Id. arts. VII, XIV. The Chamber is to hear matters referred to it by the Ombuds-
man or brought to its attention by individuals, organizations, or groups alleging human
rights violations. See id. art. VIII(I). How its jurisdiction relates to that of the Constitu-
tional Court under Article VI(3)(c) of the Constitution is unclear. See id. art VIII. For dis-
cussion of the constitutional order in Bosnia and Herzegovina, see Gaeta, supra note 65, at
160-62.
326. See Genocide, supra note 293.
327. See id. at 454 (Kreda, J., dissenting).
328. See Genocide, supra note 293, at 21 (Kreda, J., dissenting). For discussion, see
Thomas D. Grant, Territorial Status, Recognition, and Statehood: Some Aspects of the
Genocide Case (Bosnia and Herzegovina v. Yugoslavia) (appearing in 33 STAN. J. INT'L L.
2 (1997)); see also supra notes 101-18 and accompanying text (discussing autonomy and
statehood).
329. See supra note 243 (citing Cassese on the transparency of international law).
330. The resource limitations of small States may, for example, also limit their ability
to conduct foreign relations. RONALD P. BARSTON, The External Relations of Small States,
in SMALL STATES IN INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS 43-44 (August Schou & Ame Olav
Brundtland, eds., 1971).
331. DuuRSMA, supra note 1, at 246 (noting that San Marino encounters difficulty
processing the large quantity of documents produced by the Council of Europe).
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on the bench, the entities may be more likely to comply with regional and other




A number of minor changes and additions could have enhanced a work already
remarkably exhaustive. The European Micro-State is curious, not least of all, in
its territorial aspect; this book about the Micro-State would have profited from
maps. Their absence highlights Duursma's emphasis on the legal nature of state-
hood. Statehood interpreted mainly as a bundle of rights, however, might not be
the whole of statehood. For a comprehensive view of the phenomenon, one also
must draw attention to its manifestations in territory and activity. The territorial
and population requirements of statehood do not substantially detain the author,
even though the diminutiveness of the entities arguably lurked behind concerns
voiced in other terms before international bodies. Their physical situations, en-
claved within much larger States, are critical to understanding the constraints,
well documented by Duursma, which confront the Micro-States. Indeed, the
physical situation of the Micro-States may be the cardinal fact of their peculiar
existences. Whether or not one dismisses the limits of geography as "merely" a
practical or political issue, some graphic display of those limits would have been
instructive. Moreover, questions of politics and law aside, many readers may not
be as familiar with European geography as Continental public international law
scholars.
Duursma has produced a useful and enlightening book. The work is treatise-
like in the depth of its coverage of a comparatively little-known comer of the soci-
ety of States. Yet, the book convincingly displays that its topic is anything but a
backwater of public international law. The European Micro-State exists in spite of
pressure for consolidation and the practical, if not legal, dominance of neighbors.
At the same time, the demonstrated capacity of the Micro-State to integrate itself
into international society may assuage concerns that very small territorial entities
present a threat to global order. Through sometimes fitful participation in mul-
tilateral organizations, accession to bilateral and trilateral treaties, and the inter-
nalization of international norms, especially those governing human rights, the
Micro-State suggests ways to mediate the tension between diversity and disorder.
332. See Papastathopoulos, supra note 311, at 138. Papastathopoulos notes that the ex-
tent to which that presence erodes independence will depend in part upon the power of the
judiciary within the State in question. Id. The judicial arrangement in C)prus under the
1960 constitution was noted to contain "an element of dicastocracy"-rule by the court. Id.
Where the judiciary has extensive povers, external involvement in the judiciary might
pose a more serious problem than where the judiciary's role is modest. Also, the purpose
of external judicial staffing may be material to the legal effect on State independence. Per-
haps a State in extremis like Cyprus or Cambodia can more readily admit such external
influence. But if installed for purposes less vital than securing the very survival of the
State, perhaps the phenomenon more seriously compromises independence.
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Whether the diminutive territorial entity has attained and can maintain or amplify
the independence Duursma identifies as its legal right is a question over which
this book hopefully will spur further debate.
